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Indigenous-settler relationships in Canada are grounded in constitutional obligations. 
When actors dispute the terms of Indigenous-settler relationships, these actors are seeking to 
change the nature and scope of existing constitutional obligations. The Crown’s duty to consult 
Indigenous peoples is a constitutional obligation that is disputed between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples. The practices that guide actors’ behaviours when contesting constitutional 
obligations, such as the duty to consult, influence the development of Indigenous-settler relations. 
Two main groups of actors portray different behaviours and practices when disputing 
constitutional obligations. Actors within institutions and actors engaging in collective mobilization 
interact with each other to change the character of Indigenous-settler relationships. A case study 
analysis portrays the dialogical interactions between institutions and social movements. The results 
reveal that actors confront their differences in a manner that prevents Indigenous-settler 
relationships from improving. For instance, institutions do not consider Indigenous interpretations 
of proper consultation before articulating consultation protocols. Consequently, only crisis 
situations, which are often provoked by Indigenous social movements, signal to institutions that 
different interpretations of consultation exist. However, using crises to initiate engagement with 
constitutional disputes results in parties treating other perspectives with distrust. Hostility between 
parties is communicated within dialogical processes, preventing Indigenous-settler relationships 
from respecting differences and reconciling interests. A new advisory institution that respects and 
articulates different interests may facilitate reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
perspectives. Implementing this reform would transform the contestation of constitutional 
obligations into a regular practice of engaging with different perspectives to improve Indigenous-
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Describing the current relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state is 
problematic. The evolution of this relationship includes initiatives that have achieved mixed results 
for improving Indigenous-settler relations. Indigenous peoples’ rights are constitutionally 
protected, which provides a legal framework for ensuring that Indigenous interests are considered 
at the highest level of decision-making. Nevertheless, the socio-political position of Indigenous 
peoples distressingly reveals that Canada insufficiently addresses Indigenous interests.1 Although 
material resources can address some problems faced by Indigenous peoples, reforming how 
government interacts with Indigenous peoples will also strengthen Indigenous nations. Indeed, the 
government’s treatment of Indigenous perspectives reflects the character of Indigenous-settler 
relationships. The state’s interactions with Indigenous peoples are guided by certain constitutional 
                                                          
1 James Anaya, “The situation of indigenous peoples in Canada,” United Nations Human Rights Council, 27th 
Session, Agenda Item 3 (May 7, 2014): at para. 81.  
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obligations that are entrenched in Canada’s constitutional order. Consequently, Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous peoples dispute the terms of a just Indigenous-Crown relationship by 
reinterpreting those constitutional obligations.  
The objective of this thesis is to examine the conflict between competing visions of 
Indigenous-settler relationships by shifting the focus of analysis; rather than discerning the 
interests of each party and proposing alternative objectives that reconcile those interests, this 
research analyzes the dialogical processes that guide actors’ behaviour. The character of 
Indigenous-settler disputes reflects the practices Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state use to 
exchange different interests and contest the status quo. These practices are influenced by the 
specific roles actors may adopt. For instance, actors that operate in institutions behave differently 
than actors participating in collective mobilization; each role, such as a position in upholding 
institutions or collective mobilization, guides actors’ behaviours. The behaviours of actors in 
specific roles are in a dialogical relationship with other actors in different roles. In order to identify 
actors’ behaviours and the dialogical relationship with other behaviours, theories of institutional 
change and social movements are applied in the Indigenous-settler context. Together, these 
theories explain how different actors in specific roles that are responsible for reinterpreting 
Indigenous-settler relationships exchange their perspectives. The development of these exchanges 
may produce constitutional disputes; as such, reforming the practices that guide interaction 
between actors will transform how constitutional disputes are resolved.  
Recognizing that different behaviours influence Indigenous-Crown interactions is essential 
to understanding the actions of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples when disagreements occur. 
Identifying each party’s demands only partially explains why Indigenous-Crown relations trigger 
moments of conflict and tension. Each party’s interests are influenced by the practices that 
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Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors use to communicate their values and engage with different 
perspectives. According to this approach, conflict is the product of specific practices of 
communicating interests and treating different perspectives that generate distrust and hostility with 
other actors. Analyzing interactions identifies the circumstances that may shift actors’ behaviours 
to display more respect towards different interests. As such, an approach that emphasizes the 
dialogical interactions between Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors may expose more viable 
options for reforming Indigenous-Crown relations.  
 The Crown’s constitutional duty to consult is an important dimension of Indigenous-Crown 
relations. This duty states that the Crown must consult Indigenous peoples when Indigenous rights 
or rights claims are affected by Crown proposals.2 Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state 
exchange their different perspectives regarding the nature and scope of the duty to consult through 
specific practices or procedures. A case study approach that examines specific instances in which 
the duty to consult was disputed by actors will illustrate whether actors are developing new 
conventions for contesting constitutional obligations. Indeed, the duty to consult provides a unique 
perspective to understand the character of Indigenous-Crown interactions and embodies important 
principles that could improve existing practices of appropriate interaction.    
 This thesis depicts the broad patterns of actors’ behaviours during interactions with other 
forces and actors, and the consequences of those interactions with regards to the state of 
Indigenous-settler relationships. This approach attempts to comprehensively illustrate the 
behavioural dynamics that underpin Indigenous-settler relations. The literature addressing 
Indigenous-state relationships has not considered how dialogical processes in themselves can alter 
the development of Indigenous-settler relationships. Instead, the literature uses the perspective of 
                                                          
2 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 at para. 27. 
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one party to reveal points of contestation with other actors. This thesis integrates the perspectives 
of different actors by analyzing the dialogical relationship that engages those different 
perspectives. This thesis provides a model that uncovers the dialogical processes in Indigenous-
settler relationships and raises propositions for improving the development of Indigenous-settler 
relationships.  
 The analysis in Chapter 1 begins with a review of the existing literature regarding the state 
of Indigenous-settler relationships. This literature clearly portrays the breadth of Indigenous 
constitutional demands. Indigenous peoples propose different reforms that promote a new vision 
of a just relationship with the Crown. However, Indigenous perspectives only partly constitute the 
system of Indigenous-settler relationships. The development of Canada’s constitutional order is 
elaborated in Chapter 2. Canada’s constitutional order establishes the parameters of Indigenous-
settler relationships by determining how actors are encouraged to contest their constitutional 
obligations. In particular, the recognition of Indigenous rights in Canada’s Constitution 
dramatically transformed the boundaries of status quo Indigenous-settler relationships. Together, 
the analysis on the existing literature regarding Indigenous constitutional demands and the 
evolution of Indigenous rights in Canada’s constitutional order will provide the backdrop in which 
actors exchange different interpretations of constitutional obligations.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 reinterpret existing political theories within the context of Indigenous-
settler relationships. Chapter 3 explores institutions’ responses to external contestation regarding 
Indigenous-Crown constitutional obligations, and how those responses recreate the status quo of 
just Indigenous-settler relationships. Institutions are the mechanisms that recognize and protect 
Indigenous rights. As such, analyzing theories of institutional change explains how institutions 
address Indigenous visions of just constitutional relationships when current practices are disputed. 
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In particular, historical institutionalism is scrutinized to determine if it can explain institutional 
decision-making when confronted with external contestation. Case law pertaining to the duty to 
consult and the government’s consultative guidelines represent institutional decision-making and 
practices. These case studies will demonstrate the evolution of institutions’ understandings of the 
duty to consult and how institutions promote their vision of a just relationship in response to 
external contestation.  
 Chapter 4 articulates the role of social movement theories in understanding the interactions 
between actors disputing Indigenous-settler relationships. Social movement theory, in particular 
the political process model, is examined to determine whether the theory can explain how 
Indigenous peoples’ constitutional demands are communicated to institutions. Moreover, the 
moment in which collective mobilization is triggered is often in a dialogical relationship with 
institutional decision-making. Social movement theory may detect how dialogical forces present 
both opportunities and constraints for reinterpreting constitutional obligations. For instance, 
institutions respond to external pressures, such as pressures provoked by collective mobilization; 
after institutions decide on a response, the future actions of groups are guided by the new 
opportunities and constraints created by the institutions’ initial response. Analyzing case studies 
that represent Indigenous forms of social movements will detect how Indigenous groups interact 
with other actors, and how these interactions affect Indigenous groups’ capacity to contest 
Indigenous-settler relationships in the future.     
 Chapter 5 connects the previous analyses on actors’ exchanges that dispute status quo 
Indigenous-settler relationships. This connection reveals that the particular manner in which actors 
interact to express contestation over constitutional obligations influences the character of 
Indigenous-settler relationships. As the character of Indigenous-settler relationships shifts, actors’ 
6 
 
future decision-making and actions are also transformed. Based on the development of institutions’ 
interpretations of the duty to consult and subsequent Indigenous forms of social movements, 
Indigenous-settler relationships are not developing in a manner that promotes constructive 
exchanges between actors. Despite how Canada’s constitutional order facilitates citizens’ capacity 
to contest the constitutional status quo, certain practices within current Indigenous-Crown 
interactions prevent actors from reimagining a constitutional relationship that meaningfully 
recognizes different perspectives. The section concludes with the implications of this dilemma, 
and a possible institutional mechanism to remedy ineffectual interactions. When institutions fail 
to consider Indigenous interpretations of proper consultation, crisis situations are perceived as the 
only available mechanism to expose different interpretations of constitutional obligations. Crises 
often intensify distrust between parties, which undermines opportunities to reconcile competing 
Indigenous-settler interests. Implementing an advisory institution can facilitate reconciliation if 
the institution respectfully mediates between conflicting interests and enhances the perception of 
















The Indigenous peoples of Canada seek to make constitutional space for their vision of a 
just political order. When mobilizing to engage the Canadian government in the legal and political 
arenas of the Canadian state, Indigenous peoples, like other citizen groups, have ceaselessly 
articulated clear and sophisticated arguments for recognition and respect of their constitutional 
vision. Political and legal mobilization to change the fundamental character of the Canadian 
constitutional order remains a current issue for certain prominent groups, despite assertions that 
the era of “mega-constitutional politics”3 is over. The current literature on the subject of 
Indigenous claims to change the Canadian constitutional framework focuses on articulating the 
Canadian state’s obligation, grounded in constitutional law, to negotiate new political relationships 
                                                          
3 See Peter Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 2004).  
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with Indigenous nations. Whether Indigenous status of nationhood4 or citizenship5 should be the 
guiding principle that informs interpretations of fundamental justice and political obligations with 
non-Indigenous peoples are the main points of tension that separate the demands of certain 
Indigenous groups and the Canadian state. These perspectives are highly crucial in determining 
the positions and constitutional demands of both the Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state.  
The scholarship that evaluates Indigenous constitutional visions has expanded to include 
multidisciplinary approaches. Legal scholars analyze whether parts of Canadian constitutional law 
has the capacity to accommodate or address Indigenous constitutional demands. Their work on 
assessing the continuing relevancy of laws enshrined in the Royal Proclamation, 1763, the historic 
treaties, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 reveals that 
Canada’s constitutional order recognizes a unique space for Indigenous peoples to pursue their 
own visions of justice and political order.6 According to these perspectives, Canada already has 
the constitutional tools and mechanisms that can address Indigenous peoples’ constitutional vision. 
If the principles that are currently enshrined in the constitutional order are consistently recognized 
                                                          
4 See Jacob Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); James Tully, 
“Introduction,” in Multinational Democracies, Alain-G Gagnon and James Tully, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001): 1-34; Joyce Green, Self-determination, citizenship, and federalism: Indigenous and 
Canadian Palimpsest (Regina: Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, 2003); Taiaiake Alfred, Wasase: Indigenous 
Pathways of Action and Freedom (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2005); James Youngblood Henderson, 
Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada, (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007); Kiera Ladner, “Aysaka’paykinit: 
Contesting the Rope Around the Nations’ Neck,” in Group Politics and Social Movements in Canada, Miriam 
Smith, ed. (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008): 227-249.  
5 See Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) and 
Tom Flanagan, “First Nations? Second Thoughts,” (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000). 
6 See Brian Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title. (Saskatoon: University 
of Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre, 1983); William Pentney, “The rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada and 
the Constitution Act, 1982: The Interpretive Prism of Section 25 Part I,” University of British Columbia Law Review 
22, no. 1, (1998): 21-59; Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Governments and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 34, no. 1 (1996): 61-99; Patrick Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government 
and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination,” McGill Law Journal 46, no. 2 (2001): 382-456; Michael Asch, 
“From Terra Nullius to Affirmation: Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with the Canadian Constitution,” Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society 17 (2002): 23-40; Ardith Walkem and Halie Bruce, eds. Box of Treasures or Empty 
Box? Twenty Years of Section 35 (British Columbia: Theytus Books Ltd, 2003); James Youngblood Henderson, 
Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada, (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007); John Borrows, Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).  
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and affirmed by state institutions, Indigenous rights can be realized and exercised in meaningful 
ways. Other perspectives that build on this legal approach assert that constitutionalism can be a 
method of political interaction that promotes equal coexistence between different political 
communities.7 Constitutionalism reflects a political culture that respects both differences between 
peoples as well as providing the necessary environment to negotiate partnerships for governance. 
This interpretation of constitutionalism acknowledges the position that Indigenous peoples have 
separate constitutional aspirations than the Canadian constitutional status quo; once a sense of 
separateness is established, constitutional parties can engage in equal partnerships and 
collaboration with the dominant Canadian society.  
Conversely, political scientists assess Indigenous visions of justice and political order 
through the lens of government policy and actions. These scholars investigate the effects of 
interactions between Indigenous peoples and state institutions or initiatives. Some Indigenous 
peoples’ continued resistance and agitation against government policies reveal how Indigenous 
groups have interpreted and exercised their agency to address unfavourable state action. Political 
scientists understand the legitimacy of Indigenous claims by analyzing certain key events and 
policy initiatives that trigger Indigenous mobilization, and then make inferences on what these 
events and interactions say about the demands each party puts forward.8 This perspective examines 
                                                          
7 James Tully, “Diversity’s Gambit Declined,” in Constitutional Predicament. Canada after the Referendum of 
1992, Curtis Cook, ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994): 164; See also James 
Tully, “Introduction,” in Multinational Democracies, Alain-G Gagnon and James Tully, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001): 1-34; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010); and Jeremy Webber and Colin Macleod, eds. Between Consenting Peoples: Political 
Community and the Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).  
8 See Mary Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences,” 
Canadian Human Rights Yearbook 3 (1989): 3-45; Jacob Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Joyce Green, Self-determination, citizenship, and federalism: Indigenous and Canadian 
Palimpsest (Regina: Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, 2003); Taiaiake Alfred, Wasase: Indigenous Pathways 
of Action and Freedom (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2005); Kiera Ladner, “Aysaka’paykinit: 
Contesting the Rope Around the Nations’ Neck,” in Group Politics and Social Movements in Canada, Miriam 
Smith, ed. (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008): 227-249.  
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the ways in which Indigenous peoples’ interests conflict with government objectives. As such, 
these scholars also determine how Indigenous peoples can best advance their demands given 
constraints created by colonialism. There exists contestation within the political science literature 
regarding whether Indigenous peoples can uphold their indigeneity alongside existing state 
institutions and processes. For some, Indigenous ways of being can be respected alongside 
Canada’s institutional order; consequently, all that which is Canadian would be treated as also 
reflecting indigeniety.9 For others, Indigenous peoples should distance themselves from Canadian 
institutions and processes to avoid the risk of further assimilation.10  
Furthermore, Indigenous narratives and testimony present a unique insight into Indigenous 
belief systems and community values that inform their obligations and relationships with non-
Indigenous peoples.11 Indigenous peoples’ experiences with the Canadian government’s disrespect 
for their constitutional vision vividly demonstrate the justifications for demanding the Canadian 
government to negotiate a new relationship. These writers and scholars use individual experiences 
to illustrate a collective phenomenon. Although the stories may recount personal portrayals or 
struggles, the systematic ill-treatment of Indigenous peoples as a whole by the Canadian 
government is made clearly and explicitly.  
The literature that focuses on the Indigenous constitutional perspective examines which 
framework should guide relationships with the Canadian state while maximizing Indigenous 
autonomy. The bulk of this literature seeks to explain why the Canadian government has an 
                                                          
9 John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto 2002): 
148.  
10 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009): 11.  
11 See Patricia Monture-Angus and Patricia Mcguire, eds First Voices: An Aboriginal Women's Reader (Inanna 
Publications, Toronto, 2009) and Thomas King, The Inconvenient Indian: A Curious Account of Native People in 
North America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).  
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unfulfilled obligation to collaborate on a new constitutional framework that would fundamentally 
alter the political and legal relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. The 
status of nationhood is largely grounded on legal evidence and scholarship that portrays a nation-
to-nation relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. This relationship is 
formally enshrined in the constitution, such as through historic treaties, but has not been honoured 
by the Canadian state. In the perspective of these scholars, a nation-to-nation relationship is the 
only path for decolonization that is just for Indigenous peoples.  
The literature that rejects a nation-to-nation relationship between Indigenous peoples and 
non-Indigenous peoples claim Canadian institutions and processes offer mechanisms that can 
adequately address Indigenous demands. Scholars have theorized that a nation-to-nation 
relationship is inconceivable because the assertion that Indigenous peoples are sovereign is 
“contrary to the history, jurisprudence, and national interests of Canada.”12 Consequently, historic 
treaties and agreements have no legal force. Moreover, this perspective suggests that Indigenous 
peoples should not be treated as partners alongside Canada’s federal structure because Indigenous 
cultures during first contact exposed a “civilization gap” with European societies.13 This argument 
maintains that full participation in the Canadian state is the best means to fulfill Indigenous 
peoples’ political aspirations. The position that Indigenous peoples should accept Crown 
sovereignty and relinquish demands for distinct legal and political status reflects a pro-
assimilationist perspective. Scholars have also directed their criticisms against Indigenous 
nationhood toward the problem of feasibly accomplishing the degree of recognition and autonomy 
Indigenous peoples demand. These scholars identify the practical limitations that inhibit 
                                                          
12 Tom Flanagan, “First Nations? Second Thoughts,” (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000): 66. 
13 Ibid., 38. 
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Indigenous peoples from realizing a nation status, such as the unavailability of resources to develop 
territorial-based self-governance structures.14 As such, Indigenous peoples should compromise the 
terms of their national identity to integrate to some extent as Canadian citizens in order to access 
necessary political resources.15 Unlike the assimilationist model, accepting Canadian citizenship 
still maintains the possibility of recognizing distinct rights to reflect Indigenous peoples’ unique 
position in Canada.16 A status of Canadian citizenship that makes particular concessions to 
Indigenous peoples is argued by some scholars as consistent with a liberal democratic order.17 This 
perspective suggests that the existing understanding of liberal democracy can accommodate certain 
aspects of Indigenous demands for recognition. Consequently, the Canadian state is not required 
to fundamentally change its institutions or national narrative in order to meet Indigenous interests.  
Scholars that address the relationship between Indigenous rights and Canadian 
constitutional politics evaluate the merits of whether Indigenous constitutional demands should be 
adopted into Canada’s constitutional order, and how these different constitutional visions can 
coexist. There is little attention given to how these struggles to express Indigenous rights within 
the Canadian constitutional order interacts with broader processes and tensions concerning 
institutional change and activism generated by collective mobilization. The debate regarding the 
value of Indigenous rights is affected by the constant actions of groups and institutions asserting 
their influence to determine how the polity understands its constitutional obligations. Indeed, the 
current literature only touches on how constitutional struggles are placed within the broader 
context of citizen mobilization and subsequent institutional change.  
                                                          
14 Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000): 185. 
15 Ibid., 207.  
16 Ibid., 11-12.  




For instance, Kiera Ladner argues that the objectives of decolonization and nationhood are 
not depicted in social movement theories; at best, these theories can offer only incomplete accounts 
of why Indigenous peoples choose certain mobilization strategies and organizational structures.18 
Similarly, Taiaiake Alfred asserts that Indigenous peoples need to rediscover political and legal 
empowerment separate from the Canadian constitutional order because Canadian institutions and 
processes cannot adequately address Indigenous demands.19 These two arguments represent a 
tendency to view Indigenous peoples’ constitutional visions as wholly independent from broader 
processes that characterize citizen-state relationships. Although Ladner and Alfred’s work respects 
and defends the unique positions of Indigenous peoples, the interaction with non-Indigenous 
peoples and state processes cannot be clearly separated from Indigenous visions of a just 
relationship. Indigenous peoples have unique perspectives that deserve respect. However, 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous cultures interact and influence one another through processes such 
as social movements and institutional mechanisms. Some scholarship recognizes that Indigenous 
perspectives and cultures are in a state of interaction with non-Indigenous forms of knowledge,20 
but this recognition is made in the context of specific exchanges in either political, legal, or cultural 
contexts. As such, social movement theory and theories of institutional behaviour can provide 
further insight to the ways in which Indigenous peoples choose to articulate and pursue their 
demands. Understanding the interaction between the political, legal, and social landscape in which 
                                                          
18 Kiera Ladner, “Aysaka’paykinit: Contesting the Rope Around the Nations’ Neck,” in Group Politics and Social 
Movements in Canada, Miriam Smith, ed. (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008): 244-5.  
19 Taiaiake Alfred, Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 
2005): 21.  
20 See James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) and John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: 
University of Toronto 2002): 148.  
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Indigenous peoples understand their constitutional visions will clarify the sources of tension within 
Indigenous-settler relationships.  
The constitutional relationship between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous peoples 
cannot be adequately addressed without considering the existing and imperfect ways in which 
citizens and institutions interact with one another to exert influence to determine a new 
constitutional status quo. Consequently, there is a necessity for a more comprehensive approach 
to evaluating and addressing Indigenous constitutional relationships with non-Indigenous peoples. 
Understanding the opportunities and constraints citizens face when contesting for institutional 
change is an important backdrop to Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships. This backdrop 
further influences how different constitutional visions interact, including how those visions are 


















Canada’s constitutional order provides practices that direct citizen contestation and 
interaction and protects those practices from unilateral extinguishment. For instance, the Canadian 
constitution presents certain mechanisms, such as s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 that 
Indigenous peoples can use to assert their constitutional demands. However, the development of 
those mechanisms is also a product of citizen contestation. In effect, Canada’s constitution 
provides particular procedures for citizens to contest constitutional obligations by allowing the 
constitutional order itself to be the subject of contestation. The development of the current 
mechanisms for challenging Indigenous-Crown obligations and how those mechanisms were 
attained will provide the background context to explain the character of the current state of 
Indigenous-settler relationships.  
The weariness of Canadians to address constitutional reform is incongruous with the nature 
of the document itself. The Canadian Constitution inherited the ambiguity surrounding British 
16 
 
constitutionalism, making it harder to locate and understand what visions of justice and political 
duties the Canadian Constitution represents.21 The written components of the Constitution 
emphasize only portions of the practical powers of governance, while its unwritten aspects inform 
the spirit of the constitutional order. Constitutional conventions that are understood between 
citizens through continual practice are the foundations of Canadian political life. Consequently, 
the citizens that are bound to the constitution will have to continually reassess its principles and 
functionality in changing social and political contexts. In effect, constitutional politics strongly 
influences and permeates political interactions and exchanges. For example, certain groups of 
citizens mobilize through legal and political channels to confront the elements of Canada’s 
constitutional order they perceive as unjust. This confrontation may occur between other citizens, 
associations of citizens, or institutions. During political interactions, constitutional duties and 
identities are often identified and made the subject of possible adjustments. Conflicting 
interpretations of constitutional responsibilities between citizens and institutions are brought to 
bear on the existing constitutional order. As a result, the Constitution and its vision of fundamental 
justice and political duties evolve to recognize and respect new claims from different groups of 
citizens; indeed, this evolution is made possible through peoples’ political wisdom and experiences 
of addressing constitutional conflicts.22  
 Within a constitutional framework that expects transformations and alterations, it is 
necessary that citizens can contest and renegotiate the terms of their relationship with the state. 
The role of peoples’ political experiences and knowledge are brought forward to most effectively 
pursue constitutional change. Since the constitutional order is being renegotiated and reinterpreted 
                                                          
21 James Mallory, “The Pattern of the Constitution,” in Essential Readings in Canadian Constitutional Politics, 
Christian Leuprecht and Peter Russell, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011): 7. 
22 Peter Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (Toronto: Toronto University 
Press, 2004): 265.  
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through various citizen interactions,23 the relationship between citizens and the state is also in a 
state of contestation and ambiguity. Indeed, when citizens mobilize themselves and their 
knowledge to effectively pursue constitutional change, they often appeal to the institutions that 
have the strongest stake in interpreting and protecting parts of the constitution that is under dispute. 
There is a multiplicity of individual citizens and citizen groups with their own distinct set of 
knowledge and understanding of the constitutional order. The same complexity and multiplicity 
exists among institutions that are responsible for interpreting Canada’s constitution. The 
constellation of institutions responsible for interpreting and upholding the constitution reflects the 
different approaches required for a holistic understanding of constitutional relationships. For 
instance, both a political and legal approach to interpreting the constitution upholds and respects 
the transformative nature of the constitution. The “living tree” doctrine outlines a model of 
constitutional interpretation in which the legal principles apparent in Canada’s Constitution should 
be treated in ways that accommodate for necessary adjustments according to contemporary 
political realities.24 As such, both legal and political considerations must reach a degree of 
congruence to make modifications to the constitutional order in a manner that reflects the 
constitution’s growing and evolutionary nature. 
 The tradition for incremental constitutional adaption and evolution is arguably the only 
mechanism for constitutional change given the seemingly insurmountable barriers to formal 
constitutional amendment found in the Constitution Act, 1982. According to the amending 
formula, most constitutional amendments require securing a majority of votes in the two houses 
of the federal Parliament, as well as a majority of votes in seven out of ten provincial parliaments 
                                                          
23 James Tully, “Introduction,” in Multinational Democracies, Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001): 21. 
24 Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General) [1930] A.C. 124 at page 136. 
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representing at least fifty percent of the population.25 In some instances of formal amendments, 
such as changing the offices of the Queen, Governor General, and the formula itself, a unanimous 
vote is required by both houses of the federal Parliament as well as all of the provincial 
parliaments.26 Additionally, amendments to the constitutional provisions relating to Aboriginal 
peoples, such as Class 24 of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, s. 25, and s. 35, requires a 
constitutional conference involving negotiations between the Prime Minister, the first ministers of 
the provinces, and Aboriginal leaders.27  
Attempts at formal constitutional change, such as the Meech Lake Accord and the 
Charlottetown Accord, have failed under these stringent criteria. Although the amending formula 
should exhibit some rigidity to balance the processes of constitutional evolution,28 the experiences 
of Meech Lake and Charlottetown demonstrate the difficulty of constructively assessing the 
constitutional claims of different peoples in formal institutional processes. The intergovernmental 
approach used in Meech Lake was rejected by Canadians because it appeared that executive 
processes were unilaterally changing citizens’ constitutional rights.29 The referendum used to 
determine the ratification of the Charlottetown Accord also did not yield constitutional reform 
because citizens felt their diverse constitutional interests were endangered by other citizens’ 
constitutional demands.30 After the fatigue of failing to implement constitutional reform, an 
incremental approach to constitutional change has been the status quo in Canadian constitutional 
politics.  
                                                          
25 Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, sec. 38, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  
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 Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships are a distinct relationship that is contested 
among citizens as well as between citizens and institutions. Like the entire Canadian constitutional 
order, Indigenous-settler relationships are also expressed through several different constitutional 
documents. However, the origin of Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships preceded the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canada. Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships 
arguably came into fruition from economic compacts. These pacts were between Indigenous 
nations and fur traders from European trading companies. Companies like the Hudson’s Bay 
created company Charters that outlined rights to access the lands and its resources in Canada. 
However, despite the existence of these Charters, European fur traders had to respect Indigenous 
trading protocols for the fur trade to be a commercial success.31 European fur traders became adept 
at participating in Indigenous trade and diplomacy. Although a close relationship emerged on the 
basis of promoting beneficial economic transactions, the two parties had a different understanding 
of the significance of the trading relationship. For Europeans, accommodating and participating in 
Indigenous trade protocols was a necessary step to achieving commercial success. Conversely, 
Indigenous nations treated the participation of the European fur traders as representing a 
willingness to establish a familial relationship; a familial tie was assumed because trade only 
occurred between Indigenous nations when peace and complementary interests could be 
guaranteed.32 For Indigenous nations, a relationship between families expressed through trading 
set the context for future expectations regarding appropriate dealing with European fur traders, 
and subsequently European settlers. At least for the Indigenous nations, the first economic 
compacts influence standards of a just Indigenous-settler constitutional relationship. 
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   When New France became British territory under the Treaty of Paris, King George III 
issued the Royal Proclamation on October 7, 1763. The Proclamation explicitly established a new 
constitutional framework for the relationship between Indigenous peoples and settlers. The British 
administration was weary of potential conflict between Indigenous communities and settlers who 
were fraudulently taking Indigenous lands. The Royal Proclamation, 1763, states that Indigenous 
lands “should not be molested or disturbed” if they were not explicitly ceded to the British 
Crown.33 As such, lands that were not purchased by the Crown “are reserved to [Indigenous 
peoples]”.34 Furthermore, only the British Crown could purchase land from Indigenous peoples, 
thus protecting Indigenous communities from predatory land purchases from third parties. 
However, this constitutional framework assumed that the British Crown held sovereignty over the 
lands, even if the Proclamation acknowledges the existence of Aboriginal title.35 Indeed, the 
British Crown respected Indigenous peoples’ use and occupation of the land, even if that land was 
broadly treated as Britain’s “dominion”.36 Despite the contestation regarding which party held 
sovereignty over the land, both the British and Indigenous nations understood a direct 
constitutional relationship would be the context for future dealings and interactions. Accordingly, 
the Proclamation provided the framework for the historic treaties between specific Indigenous 
nations and the Crown because an explicit constitutional relationship was articulated and affirmed. 
For Indigenous nations who did not sign historic treaties with the Crown, they argue that the 
Proclamation stands as evidence that those nations and their lands should remain unmolested by 
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the Canadian government. The Royal Proclamation is also currently recognized as part of 
Canada’s constitutional heritage.37 
 As more settlers took residence in the Canadian colonies, different practices and 
interpretations of treaty making with Indigenous peoples emerged.38 The different procedures and 
interpretations of treaty making that did not always respect the solemn constitutional relationship 
outlined in the Proclamation add to the complexity of Indigenous-settler relationships that was 
apparent since the economic compacts with European fur traders. Like the fur traders who acted 
out of necessity for their trading interests, the treaties were hastily arranged according to the 
economic interests of European settlers.39 The treaty commissioners would often make oral 
promises to Indigenous nations that differed greatly from the written treaties. This difference 
occurred because treaty commissioners were pressured to secure agreements; as such, they made 
promises to protect Indigenous ways of living, while presenting documents to sign that interfered 
with Indigenous peoples’ livelihoods.40 In other instances, the Crown did not negotiate treaties in 
good faith, and consequently failed to meet the terms outlined in treaties. Although Canada does 
not recognize the historic treaties as representing a relationship with separate sovereign nations 
similar to international contexts,41 Indigenous nations maintain that they have a distinct nation-to-
nation relationship characterized by non-interference, or want to be treated as equal partners in the 
preservation of Canada.42  
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The historic treaties perpetuate the tensions within Indigenous-settler relationships. The 
treaties are recognized as part of Canada’s constitutional inheritance, but those very constitutional 
obligations could be extinguished and infringed by the Crown through federal legislation until 
1982.43 Historic treaties are protected by more stringent constitutional mechanisms after 1982 
because Indigenous nations contested and agitated for this constitutional recognition during the 
federal government’s initiative to patriate the Constitution. The dilemma is that Indigenous 
mobilization for constitutional recognition of their rights is driven by the understanding that they 
should have always been treated as equal partners. However, the judiciary does not retroactively 
apply constitutional protections provided by s. 35 on Aboriginal rights that were extinguished prior 
to 1982; the judiciary states that the Constitution Act, 1982 does not revive extinguished Aboriginal 
rights.44 The judiciary’s decision to deny the application of current constitutional protections to 
previous decisions promotes legal consistency, but at the cost of disregarding the continuing 
different interpretations of Indigenous-settler relationships. The transformative potential of the 
constitutional protections in 1982 is severely limited if those new protections do not address how 
Indigenous perspectives contested the dominant understanding of a just constitutional relationship 
long before 1982. Canadian institutions may not be adequately addressing Indigenous 
constitutional expectations if they do not consider how past Crown actions were also contrary to 
Indigenous visions of a just constitutional order. Instead, determining whether historic treaties are 
constitutionally valid is a matter of discerning if the terms of extinguishment or infringement is 
achieved before or after 1982. However, this seemingly straightforward process obscures how the 
historic treaties themselves are sites of constitutional contention. As such, following different 
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criteria of extinguishment according to a timeline of different constitutional processes may 
inadequately address different interpretations of how to respect historic treaties.  
 The Constitution Act, 1982 represents a constitutional turning point for Indigenous nations, 
as well as other citizen groups in Canada. In s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Aboriginal rights 
were recognized and affirmed, which included the rights of Indian, Inuit, and Métis peoples.45 This 
recognition did not articulate or create the characteristics of Aboriginal rights, indicating that 
institutions and citizens would be responsible for negotiating the nature and scope of those rights. 
Instead, s. 35 constitutionalized the recognition that Aboriginal rights exist under the common law. 
Section 35 also entrenched historic treaties and the Royal Proclamation, 1763 into Canada’s 
constitutional order. Indeed, s. 35 explicitly entrenches many aspects of Indigenous-Crown 
relations that were previously expressed in statutes. Furthermore, s. 35 is interpreted as a 
constitutional mechanism that underpins an obligation between the Crown and Indigenous nations 
to reconcile their interests.46 Past Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships are explicitly 
entrenched and recognized, as well as an obligation to negotiate and pursue new constitutional 
relationships grounded in reconciliation and fairness. These dimensions of Indigenous-Crown 
relations also inform broader Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships because the rights and 
expectations outlined in the Constitution guide and inform Indigenous-settler interactions.  
 The constitutional recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights in 1982 was a product 
of political mobilization and activism. The judiciary interprets the constitutional obligations 
protected by s. 35. In the 1997 landmark case Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) 
stated that the purpose of s. 35 is to promote reconciliation between the fact that Indigenous 
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peoples existed and lived on the same land that the Crown asserts its sovereignty.47 Consequently, 
Indigenous peoples must prove that they used and occupied the land before the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty in order to claim Aboriginal title; this land use must have also been exclusive and 
show continuity.48 Moreover, if Indigenous peoples want to protect particular site-specific 
practices or customs as Aboriginal rights, they must prove that those traditions are integral to their 
distinctive culture.49 Aboriginal title is considered by the judiciary as a specific kind of Aboriginal 
right, even though securing title does not require proving that the Indigenous nation used the land 
for culturally distinctive purposes.50 Section 35 provides the framework by which Indigenous 
peoples can make claims for Aboriginal title and rights. However, the judiciary’s interpretation of 
s. 35 also indicates that the need to reconcile Indigenous occupation of the land prior to Crown 
sovereignty with the existence of the Canadian state guides the spirit of Indigenous-settler 
constitutional relationships. Indeed, the ways in which s. 35 influences the processes that engage 
both Indigenous peoples and the Crown will determine how Indigenous-settler constitutional 
relationships will evolve.   
A particularly pertinent aspect of Indigenous-Crown relations that is affecting Indigenous-
settler relationships is the Crown’s duty to consult. Canada’s economic interests in resource 
extraction and development are powerful motivations for the government to directly confront the 
nature and scope of the Crown’s duty to consult. The duty is an extension of the Crown’s fiduciary 
obligation towards Indigenous peoples, in which the Crown must act in the interests of Indigenous 
peoples.51 The SCC stated that this obligation represents a relationship of trust rather than between 
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adversaries.52 Consequently, the parties in a relationship grounded in trust govern their behaviour 
on standards of honour and fair dealing.53 The duty is triggered when Crown actions may adversely 
affect Aboriginal rights or title, even if those rights are undergoing processes of negotiation.54 
Depending on the nature of the Crown’s infringement of Aboriginal rights, the Crown may also 
be obligated to accommodate Indigenous interests through acts such as compensation.55 The SCC 
also ruled that the degree to which the Crown honours its duty to consult is contingent on the 
strength of the Aboriginal rights or rights claim, and the extent of the proposed Crown infringement 
on those rights or rights claims.56 As such, each situation may entail different requirements for 
fulfilling the duty.  
The duty to consult is a significant feature of Aboriginal rights because it acts as a 
mechanism to reconcile Indigenous and non-Indigenous interests. The duty has the potential to 
protect Aboriginal rights in changing social contexts because consultation must occur when the 
Crown’s actions may adversely affect those rights. Indigenous peoples do not hold a veto to 
prevent the advancement of Crown proposals or decisions. Nevertheless, consultation can prompt 
the Crown and Indigenous nations to negotiate a new constitutional relationship, which involves 
providing the opportunity to articulate the different constitutional expectations between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. As one dimension of respecting s. 35, the duty can be the 
mechanism to address past constitutional misunderstandings; addressing past injustices would 
strengthen and create a relationship of trust between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples; such 
a relationship of trust allows each party to set the terms and protocols for how Indigenous interests 
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are treated alongside Canadian interests. As such, the duty could necessitate processes so that each 
party can come forward with suggestions on how to best respect rights for all peoples. Because s. 
35 does not explicitly articulate the nature and scope of Aboriginal rights, the duty to consult 
becomes the process by which Indigenous and non-Indigenous parties can begin a conversation 
regarding when and how Aboriginal rights are implicated in government decision-making. 
Consequently, the duty to consult requires thorough examination to understand how the Canadian 

















The nature of Canada’s constitutional order produces different interpretations of the 
constitution between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. The institutions responsible for 
interpreting the constitution must adjust accordingly to address those different interpretations. 
Indigenous-settler relationships undergo this adjustment by the ways in which institutions react to 
changing social expectations. Section 35 demonstrates the need for both judicial and political 
institutions to honour Crown obligations to Indigenous peoples. The judiciary has interpreted s. 35 
as providing a legal framework for Indigenous peoples to make rights claims. Conversely, the 
government has a duty to negotiate with Indigenous peoples in order to reach a mutually acceptable 
constitutional partnership. These two responsibilities of upholding a clear legal framework to guide 
Indigenous rights claims and the government’s obligation to maintain meaningful interactions with 
Indigenous peoples is meant to achieve the reconciliation and rights protection outlined in s. 35. 
As such, it is necessary for the judiciary and the government to treat Indigenous constitutional 
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demands with consistency and clarity within their respective spheres of influence. Otherwise, 
major disagreements between institutions on basic expectations regarding the nature of appropriate 
Indigenous-Crown relations will cause all parties to act in a state of political and legal uncertainty. 
A lack of consistency may produce unpredictable responses from both Indigenous peoples and 
institutions that are detrimental to the protection of constitutional rights.  Institutions attempt to 
express s. 35 rights, such as the duty to consult, through policy-making and the formulation of 
legal norms. Indeed, the Crown’s duty to consult provides a useful approach to evaluating how 
institutions work together, albeit in volatile ways, to interpret Indigenous-settler constitutional 
obligations.  
 
Theories of Institutional Change  
A historical institutional approach to understanding how institutions change in reaction to 
societal pressures is useful for demonstrating how the unfolding of particular events57 shape 
institutions’ decisions and interests. The model operates on the assumption that certain historical 
events present institutions with a set of decisions; once a decision is taken, the institution’s 
trajectory of existence is dependent on the path it chose in that initial decision.58 Thus, institutions 
are a product of the historical events that triggered certain actions to be taken. Besides the path 
dependency nature of historical institutionalism, the theory also includes the role of critical 
junctures. Critical junctures are moments in which drastic or fundamental institutional change is 
possible, because the available decisions have never been presented before this event occurred; 
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when a decision is taken, the previously available alternatives are closed.59 In effect, critical 
junctures have the ability to completely change the trajectory of an institution. These moments are 
relatively rare because apart from those instances of momentous change, institutions otherwise 
operate in a stable equilibrium.60 As such, critical junctures punctuate institutional equilibrium to 
instigate institutional change. Once the juncture is closed, the equilibrium is restored and the 
institution is considered stable.  The historical institutional model explains how specific historical 
events act as catalysts that perpetuate the current contestation between actors and institutions 
regarding the nature of Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships. Past sequences of events 
also influence which avenues are available for triggering institutional change. The nature and 
scope of institutional constraints that act as barriers to renegotiating a new relationship are 
influenced by historical precedents. Indeed, historical institutionalism offers a comprehensive 
understanding to how Indigenous-settler relationships are often mired by conflicting 
interpretations, in both the past and present. 
Historical institutionalism’s model of path dependency is a useful way to analyze the 
evolution of Indigenous-settler relationships, and to attempt to predict how it will continue to 
evolve. Although institutions are often treated as stable, self-perpetuating entities, they are actually 
in a constant state of change. The institutions must decide on several factors that make up their 
existence, such as how to redistribute goods and power, what their appropriate roles are, and what 
guidelines or interpretations they should use to perform their tasks; indeed, all of these functions 
are connected and are the subject of ongoing contestation and reinterpretation.61 Institutions appear 
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stable because they are able to garner a consistent coalition that supports their actions and 
decisions.62 This coalition is always shifting, so it is important that institutions make decisions that 
can sustain support to keep the institution meaningful. That is not to say that all institutions exist 
solely to satisfy the interests of enough individuals for support; rather, institutions attempt to act 
as faithfully within their respective roles as society’s expectations allow. As long as institutions’ 
roles and decisions are regarded as meaningful and legitimate, institutions will continue to exist. 
However, making legitimate decisions requires institutions to be open to the possibility of 
adjusting their behaviour. These adjustments can resemble different aspects of institutional change 
that allow for the coalition of supporters to recognize the institution.   
The punctuated equilibrium model does not portray or evaluate the ways in which 
institutions react to shifting narratives of Indigenous-settler relationships in all instances. The 
punctuated equilibrium theory emphasizes moments in history in which institutions recognized 
Indigenous rights that was contrary to the previous equilibrium when those rights were not 
articulated or recognized. An example of institutional equilibrium could be when Aboriginal title 
was not yet recognized. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council dismissed the idea that 
Indigenous peoples held title to land. Instead, the JCPC stated that Indigenous peoples occupied 
land based on a usufructuary right.63 Thus, the Crown was perceived as owning all lands, while 
allowing Indigenous people to occupy land. This decision supported the Canadian government’s 
assimilationist policies under the Indian Act because Indigenous peoples had no legal recourse to 
assert their autonomy. Furthermore, the White Paper was introduced in 1969, which was an 
assimilationist policy that would effectively eliminate Indigenous peoples’ legal distinction from 
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Canadians. A possible critical juncture that disrupted the equilibrium between the judiciary and 
government’s treatment of Indigenous peoples was the recognition of Aboriginal title. The SCC 
decided in the Calder case that Aboriginal title existed prior to Crown sovereignty.64 After this 
critical juncture occurred, a new equilibrium was established in which Indigenous peoples gained 
more legal protection for their occupation and use of the land. Then the equilibrium model would 
assume that each subsequent decision in which state institutions recognize Indigenous perspectives 
of a just constitutional relationship would lead to a new equilibrium that is more accommodating 
to Indigenous constitutional demands.  
Despite the punctuated equilibrium model’s ability to provide some narratives of 
institutional change, this model does not account for several institutional decisions that shape 
current Indigenous-settler interactions. There is an assumption that when a critical juncture is 
present, an institution will undergo fundamental institutional change that will radically change its 
previous trajectory of actions and behaviours. The Indigenous-settler case demonstrates otherwise. 
The institutions responsible for interpreting the constitution have not always acted on chances to 
radically change status quo understandings of constitutional obligations. The most noteworthy 
example is the failure of the government to enact reforms in accordance with provisions in the 
1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. This Royal Commission was 
initiated in 1991 to address the tensions and dissatisfaction of Indigenous peoples. Indeed, the 
Royal Commission began its mandate after incidences of violence between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous communities took place, such as the Oka Crisis. The final report had recommendations 
that, if implemented, would have made sweeping changes to the ways in which government treated 
Indigenous peoples. Instead, despite Indigenous peoples’ support for the report, the government 
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did not implement the broad reforms and instead opted to address the status of Indigenous rights 
through a piecemeal approach. The judiciary’s landmark decision in Delgamuukw was another 
critical juncture that created the impetus for the government to engage with Indigenous peoples to 
form a new constitutional relationship. Nevertheless, the legal obligation outlined by the judiciary 
was still met with governmental inertia on formulating a grand constitutional framework for future 
relations. The government’s unwillingness to implement broad reforms in favour of addressing 
Indigenous demands on a policy-by-policy basis indicates that critical junctures are not the 
mechanism of institutional change that affects Indigenous-settler relationships.  
Instead, the theory that institutions are always in a state of adjustment and incremental 
change provides an additional explanation for the institutional tension resulting from contestation 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. According to this theory, institutions are always 
adjusting themselves to maintain legitimacy, and they do undergo drastic changes when those 
incremental adjustments accumulate to a critical level. Indeed, the incremental changes may 
appear insignificant until they attain a critical mass in which transformative processes occur.65 
Consequently, the events that lead to the moments in which drastic institutional change is possible 
is more significant than the timing of the event that tipped the balance to cause the change.66 In 
the case of Indigenous-settler relationships, a model of gradual institutional change that culminates 
in more fundamental institutional shifts is an additional interpretation of past events and 
subsequent decision-making. In the case of the Royal Commission in 1996, punctuated equilibrium 
theory would assume that the report itself constitutes the critical juncture because the 
recommendations present many options for institutional change that was previously inconceivable. 
                                                          




However, the government maintained the constitutional status quo, regardless of the level of 
dissatisfaction among Indigenous nations. Indeed, the decision to not implement the report’s 
recommendations led to further instability between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, which 
has repercussions for the institutions responsible for addressing that relationship. As such, those 
institutions most likely experienced instability reflective of mounting Indigenous-settler tension 
rather than a state of institutional equilibrium.  
Conversely, the gradual institutional change model would place attention on the Oka Crisis 
as representative of Indigenous-settler tensions regarding constitutional obligations. The Oka 
Crisis occurred when the Quebec government wanted to expand a golf course onto Mohawk burial 
grounds. The land in which the government was encroaching was the site of disputed land grants 
dating back before Confederation. Moreover, Indigenous peoples already felt slighted by the 
absence of their participation during the drafting of the Meech Lake Accord, an Accord which 
included a series of constitutional amendments that also disregarded Indigenous concerns. 
Although the situation of disputed land was not a new phenomenon, it was another instance of a 
similar story in which the government fails to uphold past agreements, and no progress is made to 
reopen past land disputes.67 The disagreement in Oka was the tipping point in which the dispute 
became a genuine crisis. The accumulation of similar grievances from Indigenous communities 
and the repercussions of those grievances were made apparent in the Oka Crisis. Indeed, the level 
of crisis in the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples was the underlying 
reason for initiating the Royal Commission in 1991.68 According to the gradual institutional 
change model, a state of equilibrium was not present before a rare moment of institutional change 
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was made available. A model of gradual change interprets crisis situations as the product of a series 
of gradual tensions that accumulate over time. As such, previous conflicts influence the alternative 
paths for institutional decision-making that are made available in crisis situations. In the case of 
the Oka Crisis, the government chose to re-evaluate its treatment of Indigenous peoples through a 
Royal Commission, rather than recognize the sovereignty of the Mohawk peoples. The aftermath 
of the crisis demonstrates how several options became open after the crisis, some of which would 
have ushered more fundamental institutional changes than others. Nevertheless, the decision to 
create a Royal Commission on the status of Indigenous peoples was a distinct departure from the 
status quo.  
The punctuated equilibrium theory emphasizes the institutional decisions made during the 
critical juncture because that decision may dramatically alter the trajectory of the institution’s 
status quo, or equilibrium. The gradual institutional change model directs attention to the ways in 
which incremental changes to external pressures may lead to moments of fundamental change. As 
a result, these two approaches to institutional change can point to different, but equally significant, 
factors of institutional change. However, the gradual institutional change model more explicitly 
considers the ways in which systems of institutions can themselves be sites of tension as 
institutions address the pressure of adapting to societal expectations. The perspective of 
understanding institutions as sites of tension helps detect nuanced interactions between institutions 
and external pressures. The individual perspectives of each institution responsible for interpreting 
the constitution may not complement other institutions’ positions. Since institutions are products 
of a series of adjustments and compromises made over time to secure coalitional support, those 
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past decisions form “layers” built into the institution.69 Institutions are rarely able to completely 
eliminate past roles and behaviours, so those past layers exist alongside an institution’s new 
functions and actions. These layers, although they are part of an institution’s self-understanding, 
often persist in dysfunctional ways because they are products of past events and situations that 
may not be relevant to contemporary contexts.70 The internal contradictions within institutions 
elevate the need for incremental change, as those adjustments help institutions operate consistently 
and predictably. However, it is inevitable that some vestiges of past behaviours remain, because 
incremental change involves only adjusting actions that are overtly incompatible with societal 
expectations. For instance, the judiciary and the government recognize the duty of the Crown to 
establish a new constitutional relationship with Indigenous peoples. There is some consensus 
regarding the inadequacy of Indigenous peoples’ current status quo position in Canadian society. 
For the judiciary, this perspective is layered overtop the perception that Crown sovereignty cannot 
be contested, which appears to severely limit the possibility of a new constitutional relationship. 
Conversely, the government’s privileging of majority perspectives also limits the possibility of 
accommodating a new constitutional relationship that is contrary to electoral, and thus majority, 
interests. As a result, the institutional system must make decisions that reconcile their own internal 
interests with the demands from external forces.  
Each institution responsible for interpreting constitutional relationships, the judiciary and 
the government, must confront their own internal contradictions while addressing contested 
relationships between citizens. How these institutions address Indigenous-settler relations reveals 
the types of barriers institutions themselves erect that exacerbate the difficulty of recognizing 
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different approaches to a just constitutional relationship. For example, Canada’s judiciary, most 
notably the SCC, acknowledges that when s. 35 is invoked, Aboriginal rights and title must be 
interpreted in a liberal manner.71 A broad and expansive interpretation of s. 35 allows Indigenous 
peoples to exercise their communal rights as a foundation for rebuilding their capacity to function 
as contemporary societies. In cases that have broader implications for Indigenous-settler relations, 
the judiciary recommends negotiations outside of litigation as the best process to secure 
meaningful outcomes. The judiciary’s decisions are meant to reinforce the obligation to recognize 
Indigenous peoples’ pre-existence prior to Crown sovereignty.72 However, judicial decisions do 
not articulate standards of proper protocols when addressing Indigenous constitutional demands in 
instances of government policy-making outside the parameters of a specific dispute. This refusal 
prevents the judiciary from meaningfully enforcing the constitution, which is the role of the 
judiciary.  
The Canadian government also does not clarify the parameters of just dealings with 
Indigenous peoples because of its own institutional constraints. The government prioritizes 
policies that will generate electoral success. Similar to the context of the historic treaties, the 
government engages with Indigenous peoples’ political demands when the interests of non-
Indigenous peoples are also at stake.73 However, selectively addressing Indigenous peoples’ 
constitutional demands based on non-Indigenous interests fails to uphold the Crown’s fiduciary 
relationship with Indigenous peoples. A relationship of trust cannot emerge when political support 
and resources are mobilized to benefit Indigenous peoples as a peripheral consequence from 
privileging non-Indigenous interests. The government’s agenda is also affected by the governing 
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party in power, as each party has different visions of a just constitutional relationship. Although 
an underlying obligation to uphold the honour of the Crown when dealing with Indigenous peoples 
always exists, each government may have a different approach to honouring that obligation. It may 
be difficult to engage in long-term constitutional negotiations or policy planning if successive 
governments can undo those initiatives. For example, former Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin 
negotiated the Kelowna Accord, a set of policy initiatives designed to improve the lives of 
Indigenous peoples by pledging to commit almost 5.1 billion dollars of government spending over 
the course of five years.74 The Accord was a partnership between the government, Premiers, and 
Indigenous leaders. However, the Accord was completely abandoned by Martin’s successor, 
Stephen Harper.75 The failure of the Kelowna Accord demonstrates that it may be difficult for the 
government to uphold its obligations to Indigenous peoples in a consistent manner, despite having 
the government’s constitutional honour at stake.  
The government may be acting consistently under the incentive structures of an elected 
position, but Indigenous peoples’ interests will not be adequately considered under a majoritarian 
model of decision-making. Many other minority groups face the same discrimination under a 
majoritarian model, but some constitutionally-protected identity groups receive decision-making 
influence outside the realm of elected offices. For instance, the Senate is meant to represent 
regional interests, and French-Canadian legal interests receive guaranteed representation in the 
SCC. These offices that accommodate minority interests exist because of the acceptance that those 
interests must be constitutionally protected. Indigenous interests and rights are also 
constitutionally protected, but they are not mandated to take part in Canadian institutions outside 
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of elected offices. It is the responsibility of government to uphold constitutional obligations 
alongside pursing electoral success. If the government cannot properly uphold constitutional 
obligations through policy-making alone due to electoral constraints, the government can alter 
existing institutional systems to recognize new interests. However, the process of formal 
institutional change follows the requirements of the amending formula. As such, a majority vote 
in Parliament and seven out of ten provinces representing at least fifty percent of the population 
are required, which is advantageous to the dominant perspectives in decision-making. Even the 
compositions of institutions that can protect minority interests are determined by the will of the 
majority. Although it is not wholly the government’s decision to produce an amending formula 
that privileges majorities, its effects create an impasse regarding how the government can uphold 
its responsibilities to different peoples. The government now operates with dysfunction because 
there is little incentive to address the constitutional obligations of minorities. Similar to the 
judiciary, the government inadequately balances the interests of the majority with a 
constitutionally-protected minority, resulting in the perception among Indigenous peoples that 
government is an obstacle to reaching their constitutional demands, rather than a partner.                
In an institutional system, such as the constellation of institutions responsible for 
interpreting and protecting the constitutional order, each individual institution acts, to a degree, 
contradictorily. The judiciary decides how s. 35 is respected, but does not articulate standards of 
fair dealing between Indigenous peoples and the Crown outside the parameters of a specific legal 
challenge. The federal government eschews its responsibility to protect minority constitutional 
demands despite previously experiencing how other processes of constitutional reform, such as 
formal constitutional amendment, present insurmountable barriers to achieving reform. 
Consequently, different institutions contending with their own contradictory behaviour will not 
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likely act coherently with other institutions struggling with the same internal disorder.76 In effect, 
the constellation of different institutions that attempt to operate concurrently may also present 
tensions between each institution within the constellation. In instances in which different 
institutions must act cohesively to produce a stable outcome, it is reasonable to understand how 
institutional decisions can lead to more contradictions and instability than equilibrium. 
Furthermore, institutions make decisions that are bound by path dependency, in which alternative 
decisions are contingent on the sequence of past events.77  As a result, contradictory or 
incompatible actions will limit the possibility that future actions can bridge institutional 
misconfiguration within an institutional system. 
Tensions are apparent between Canadian legal and political institutions that are responsible 
for constitutional interpretation and protection. The potential for tension is somewhat inevitable, 
as each institution understands Indigenous peoples’ contestation of their constitutional status 
according to their specific boundaries and responsibilities. The judiciary avoids articulating robust 
criteria to properly address Indigenous rights claims, and instead asserts that political negotiations 
alone will produce more meaningful results. Without providing standards or protocols to determine 
proper dealing with Indigenous peoples, the judiciary has no oversight mechanism to force 
political negotiations to occur. Without oversight mechanisms, the government is free to pursue 
their own policy mandates with the exception of instances in which the judiciary directly reverses 
or rejects government behaviour. Nevertheless, even without robust criteria of constraints, judicial 
decisions place significant conditions upon government objectives. The government typically does 
not want to engage in litigation because it obstructs the government from wholly implementing its 
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policy preferences. During litigation, the government does not defend its position by stating that 
violating their Crown obligations is a part of their mandate; rather, the government often asserts 
that their initiatives sufficiently honour Indigenous interests. As a result, tension exists between 
the judiciary and the government’s interpretation of how the government must meet its obligations 
when dealing with Indigenous peoples. 
 
Case Study Examination of Institutional Change  
Since gradual institutional change best exemplifies how institutions address Indigenous-
settler relations, institutional tension must also be an observable characteristic of those institutions’ 
interaction with one another. A prominent source of tension occurs when one institution’s 
adjustment to address contestation towards Indigenous-settler relations does not properly address 
another institution’s expectations or behaviour. The evolution of the duty to consult demonstrates 
how the judiciary and government both assert their interpretations of the duty, while attempting to 
maintain consistency across institutions to uphold the Crown’s honour. The different 
interpretations emerge incrementally as the duty to consult simultaneously evolves into an 
independent sphere of Aboriginal law. Analyzing case law pertaining to the duty to consult and 
the government’s consultation policy framework will demonstrate if inter-institutional tension is 
the outcome of institutions’ imperfect reactions to contestation regarding Indigenous-settler 
constitutional relationships.  
Only case law at the SCC level will be analyzed because those decisions, since they cannot 
be appealed, directly inform the government’s legal obligations towards Indigenous peoples. As 
such, SCC decisions set the final legal parameters for just dealings with Indigenous peoples. Cases 
selected for analysis are those that set the major criteria and boundaries regarding how the duty to 
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consult can be fulfilled. Other companion cases may be briefly referenced, but they will not be the 
focus of the discussion because they do not act as the central guidelines that indicate how the 
judiciary understands the duty to consult.  
Analyzing the government’s consultation policy framework will discern the government’s 
approach to the duty to consult. The policy will reveal how the government decides to uphold its 
legal obligations, and if the government has chosen to emphasize or de-emphasize elements of the 
SCC rulings to promote a separate vision of honouring the duty to consult. Only the federal 
consultation policy will be analyzed, although each province has established its own framework. 
For the scope of this research, the federal government’s approach to consultation is a good standard 
to determine the general consensus regarding how governing institutions uphold the duty to 
consult.   
 
Case Law  
When the duty to consult was articulated in Delgamuukw, the decision stated that 
upholding the duty was contingent on the context of the situation; as such, the duty to protect 
Indigenous interests fell on a spectrum depending on the severity of the Crown’s infringement and 
the Indigenous right.78 The SCC outlined some parameters to the spectrum of consultation, from 
stating the Crown’s obligation to involve Indigenous perspectives in decision-making, to requiring 
“full consent” from Indigenous peoples.79 The spectrum outlined in Delgamuukw reveals that since 
full consent may be required from Indigenous peoples, Indigenous peoples may, in effect, hold a 
                                                          




veto over Crown decisions. However, the SCC was mostly concerned with consultation in the 
context of infringing on proven Aboriginal title.80  
In the 2004 case Haida Nation, the next SCC level case to explicitly deal with questions of 
the duty to consult, the justices interpreted the consultation spectrum in a manner that could be 
perceived as closing the possibility of a veto for Indigenous peoples. In Haida Nation, the case 
dealt with the question of whether Indigenous rights claims, rather than proven rights, could trigger 
the duty to consult. The SCC ruled that the duty was maintained because exploiting resources or 
land the Indigenous claimant is seeking protection for violates the honour of the Crown; indeed, 
benefiting from disputed resources prevents the Indigenous claimant from using those resources if 
their rights are recognized.81 In effect, the SCC rejected the government’s actions, and outlined 
another context in which government must respect constitutional obligations to Indigenous 
peoples.  
 The SCC detailed some suggestions of appropriate consultation by using a spectrum 
model. The higher end of the consultative spectrum included “the opportunity [for Aboriginal 
peoples] to make submissions for consideration, [Aboriginal peoples’] formal participation in the 
decision-making process, and provision of written reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were 
considered and to reveal the impact they had on the decision.”82 A high level of consultation is 
triggered when the Indigenous rights claim is strong, the potential infringement of those rights by 
the Crown is significant to Indigenous peoples, and the risk of non-compensable damage is also 
high.83 The SCC’s spectrum of adequate consultation was also used to resolve the dispute in Taku 
River, in which the SCC employed their criteria set out in Haida Nation to assert that the Tlingit 
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peoples were indeed adequately consulted.84 This interpretation of the duty to consult was also 
extended in 2005 to apply to established treaty rights, since lands and rights that have been settled 
through treaties must also be consulted to the same degree as prospective title and rights to disputed 
land.85 After these landmark decisions, the SCC effectively created a new dimension to existing 
Aboriginal law,86 that has since developed further with more specifics regarding the consultative 
spectrum and when the duty is triggered. 
The next major case dealing with the duty to consult did not emerge until 2010. The Rio 
Tinto case addressed the question of whether administrative bodies were capable of fulfilling the 
Crown’s duty to consult, and if historic injustices triggered the duty. The SCC ruled that tribunals 
cannot enter into consultation with Indigenous communities without an explicit legislative 
mandate and the necessary resources to provide remedial concessions.87 As such, the government 
must provide a mandate with appropriate funding and resources in order for the duty to be fulfilled. 
However, the SCC admitted that the government could eschew its consultative obligations by 
establishing tribunals with no mandate to deal with legal questions concerning Indigenous 
interests.88 The only remedy the SCC suggested was for the Indigenous community to seek legal 
protection through litigation.89 In this case, the SCC is admitting that the government can avoid 
the duty to consult by limiting the powers of tribunals or administrative bodies, and that only 
litigation can protect Indigenous interests from this situation.  
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This framework does not promote reconciliation, which is one of the purposes of the duty 
to consult. Instead, this framework demonstrates that the duty to consult does not bind government 
actions to act honourably before legal challenges are taken. If litigation is the only option 
Indigenous peoples can ensure the government acts honourably, then Indigenous-Crown relations 
will be characterized by tension and distrust. Rio Tinto establishes the duty to consult as a 
constitutional principle that undermines the conditions for reconciliation that it seeks to establish.90 
Consequently, the SCC’s decision builds into the duty to consult a mechanism that may increase 
tensions within Indigenous-settler relationships. Furthermore, the SCC’s interpretation encourages 
inter-institutional tension. The SCC states that it is legal for the government to deny consultative 
capabilities to tribunals; however, should the government choose this legally acceptable 
alternative, a legal challenge can provoke the judiciary to force the government to act otherwise. 
Instead, the SCC would be promoting institutional harmony by explicitly stating the government 
has a legal obligation to provide tribunals with legislative mandates with resources when dealing 
with Indigenous interests. This requirement would demonstrate that both institutions are 
committed to honouring the duty to consult, since the duty is upheld by a legal standard at early 
stages in government decision-making.  
Rio Tinto also addresses the question of when the duty is triggered. The Carrier Sekani 
Tribal Council (CSTC) asserted that they have the right to be consulted on all matters concerning 
the development of a dam in British Columbia, despite not having been consulted in the initial 
creation of the dam.91 The SCC ruled otherwise, stating that only the Crown action under scrutiny 
is the specific Crown proposal relevant in the case; as such, broader projects that may adversely 
                                                          
90 Sonia Lawrence and Patrick Macklem, "From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown's 
Duty to Consult," The Canadian Bar Review 79 (Feb 2000): 254.  
91 Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650 at para. 54.  
45 
 
affect Indigenous interests and rights are not considered as triggering the duty to consult.92 This 
ruling closes the possibility of using past injustices to allow Indigenous peoples to prompt 
consultation for current infringements and violations of their interests. Although this decision 
could distinguish between honouring the duty to consult and using the duty to replace Aboriginal 
and treaty rights jurisprudence,93 the goal of constitutional reconciliation is severely curtailed 
under the SCC’s approach. Denying the use of past injustices to begin a dialogue regarding 
different expectations between Indigenous nations and settlers limits the possibility for 
reconciliation. Indeed, reconciliation could have been the constitutional mechanism that promotes 
institutional harmony between the judiciary and the government when dealing with Indigenous-
settler tensions. Under a more robust interpretation of the duty to consult, the judiciary and the 
government would treat reconciliation as requiring a holistic understanding of injustice. A holistic 
approach to reconciliation includes addressing the origins of current Indigenous-settler tensions 
from past constitutional conflicts, such as the treaty relationship that underpins Aboriginal rights. 
Conversely, the SCC’s framework of the duty to consult allows the government to selectively 
address injustices, which may increase contestation between Indigenous-settler relationships 
because past actions are not part of discussing reconciliation. The SCC recommends reconciliation 
outside of litigation, while closing the possibility of using legal obligations to guide alternative 
visions and processes of reconciliation in the political realm, such as reconciling past actions. This 
situation demonstrates how institutional decisions may not produce consistent outcomes when 
those decisions overlap with other institutions’ behaviours and actions.   
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The 2010 Little Salmon case clarified that the duty to consult existed as a constitutional 
obligation, regardless if modern treaties do not specify the duty’s existence.94 With this ruling, the 
duty to consult is reiterated as existing alongside the existing general legal framework, such as 
administrative law.95 The SCC asserted that although the Crown did indeed meet its consultation 
obligations,96 it was the government’s mistake to consider the consultation that took place a mere 
“courtesy” to the Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation (LSCFN).97 The dispute occurred because 
the Yukon government approved a land grant that may adversely affect the LSCFN without 
notifying the Indigenous community of the final decision.98 Nevertheless, the SCC discerned that 
the government consulted the LSCFN prior to the decision-making in an adequate manner, but 
also stated the LSCFN’s frustrations and concerns were made in the context of accumulated 
problems with the Yukon government.99 The SCC rightly stated that the individual filing the land 
grant application should not have their application denied because of the distrust between the 
Yukon government and the LSCFN.100 Yet, the SCC’s cautious approach is not consistent with its 
robust commitment to promoting reconciliation outside of litigation. The judiciary would not have 
overstepped its institutional boundary by further stating the government should take the spirit of 
consultation more seriously in future dealings with the LSCFN. The SCC stated that the duty to 
consult permeates existing legal principles to guide other specific constitutional expectations 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples;101 based on this premise, it is not inconsistent 
for the SCC to reiterate the Yukon government’s responsibility to maintain good communication 
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and respect for the LSCFN as a part of upholding constitutional responsibilities. Such a statement 
would confirm that government’s duty to consult informs interactions with Indigenous peoples at 
all stages of political exchanges and decision-making.  
The 2013 Behn v. Moulton Contracting is the most recent case pertaining to the duty to 
consult. The case involved individual Indigenous peoples asserting that consultation was not met 
when the Crown issued logging licenses to a logging company, while the broader Indigenous 
community complied with the Crown’s decision. Consequently, the individual Indigenous peoples 
erected a blockade that prevented the company from accessing the timber.102 The SCC left open 
the possibility that individual Indigenous peoples could claim a duty to consult independent of the 
larger Indigenous community,103 but the justices did not explicitly engage with this question. The 
SCC only clarified that individuals can assert the duty to consult as representatives of the 
Indigenous community,104 which was not the situation in the Behn case. Moreover, the SCC 
asserted that the Indigenous individuals were given opportunities to express their concerns 
regarding the decision to grant logging licenses, but chose to stay silent.105 Since the Indigenous 
individuals did not state their positions when they were consulted, creating blockades 
demonstrated an abuse of process.106 This decision demonstrates that Indigenous peoples and the 
Crown are mutually obligated to make good faith efforts to promote meaningful consultation and 
exchanges.107  
However, the SCC did not address how the Indigenous individuals engaging in the 
blockade may have had a larger stake in protecting the lands licensed to the logging company than 
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the broader Indigenous community.108 The SCC ignored this important aspect of the case because 
it had to address the question of whether an abuse of process occurred; but besides the SCC, there 
is no other institution that could consider possible reasons as to why the Indigenous individuals 
did not state their disagreement with the licenses, such as the possibility of internal constraints 
within the Indigenous community. If the SCC must adhere to the parameters of the specific case, 
then an institutional gap exists in which no other institution can explore the complex motivations 
and possible constraints of Indigenous actors. The SCC reveals gaps in the government’s handling 
of their obligation to consult, but there is no equivalent institution that thoroughly investigates how 
Indigenous communities can strengthen their capacity to uphold consultation obligations. 
Consequently, if Indigenous individuals faced obstacles to participating in consultation due to 
internal restraints, no institution would enforce an obligation for the Indigenous community to 
reform. This lack of mutual institutional oversight for Indigenous communities may contribute to 
the inability of the duty to consult to protect individuals with different rights claims.    
These cases, which demonstrate the gradual evolution of the duty to consult as a dimension 
of Aboriginal law, outline several principles and criteria to evaluate how government and 
Indigenous peoples can uphold their mutual constitutional obligations. The spectrum criterion, 
which attempts to standardize the context-specific nature of appropriate consultation, has also 
evolved. The SCC has reinterpreted the spectrum more narrowly since Haida Nation because they 
have closed the possibility of granting Indigenous peoples a veto during consultation processes. 
Haida Nation only implicitly revealed that a veto is not a component of fair consultation, since it 
was not mentioned when the SCC detailed the characteristics of “deep” consultation. Since then, 
it has been made explicit that consultation does not grant Indigenous peoples a veto over proposed 
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Crown action.109 Indeed, this is a departure from the ruling in Delgamuukw, which stated that 
certain situations will require consent from Indigenous peoples.110 The SCC found no principle in 
existing constitutional law or treaty laws that allow Indigenous peoples to exercise a veto,111 but 
the denial of such a mechanism undermines how the duty to consult supports efforts at 
reconciliation.  
It may appear counterintuitive to claim that providing one party in negotiations with a veto 
promotes reconciliation because the party with the veto can undermine good faith efforts to reach 
a mutually acceptable outcome. However, in the current state of the duty to consult, the 
government only needs to demonstrate that it considered Indigenous interests and how proposals 
could accommodate those interests. This framework reveals that the government has no legal 
obligation to dramatically reverse a Crown proposal, such as the complete discontinuation of the 
proposal. Instead, in cases where the proposal cannot be altered, Indigenous interests are 
considered through measures of accommodation.112 In effect, no matter the level of consultation, 
the Crown proposal will be carried forward. Framing the duty to consult in a manner that assumes 
the Crown proposal will be advanced undermines the degree to which Indigenous perspectives are 
balanced with Crown interests. The imbalance created by prioritizing Crown interests also 
jeopardizes efforts to find conciliatory outcomes that respect both Indigenous rights and Crown 
proposals. The current legal interpretation of the duty to consult begins with the premise that 
Indigenous interests must be reconciled with Crown actions, rather than treating both parties as 
mutually responsible for finding compromises. A veto might not promote reconciliation in and of 
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itself, but if the veto was reimagined as a mechanism to signal the need for more negotiation, the 
government may more seriously consider Indigenous perspectives.   
The evolution of the duty to consult demonstrates how the judiciary can only articulate 
standards that express the existing legal order. For instance, the judiciary states that no existing 
law provides Indigenous peoples with a veto during consultation, without considering how a veto 
power could treat both Indigenous interests and Crown interests with equal merit. Indeed, a veto 
power is one way to signify a commitment to treating Indigenous peoples as constitutional partners 
whose interests are integral to the future of Canada. Instead, the different interpretations of a just 
constitutional relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples are ignored by the 
judiciary when contemplating possible remedies to respect Indigenous interests. The judiciary 
assumes that reconciling Indigenous rights and Crown interests must occur in the context of 
upholding Crown sovereignty over the land. In effect, the SCC fails to consider Indigenous 
constitutional perspectives when formulating standards for future constitutional relations. In fact, 
the SCC has the ability to limit Crown sovereignty when the rule of law is threatened,113 but the 
SCC has continued to deny constitutional space for Indigenous legal perspectives. As a result, the 
Crown’s legal obligations to Indigenous peoples fall short of achieving reconciliation because 
Indigenous legal philosophy is not given adequate consideration,114 such as during the creation of 
standards regarding appropriate consultation.     
 
Government Policy  
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The government could counteract the judiciary’s shortcomings by formulating a 
consultative framework that addressed questions of how to reconcile fundamentally different 
interpretations of Indigenous-settler relationships. Unlike the judiciary, the government does not 
have to justify new initiatives solely based on legal precedent. As long as the government abides 
by the legal norms set out by the judiciary, the government can expand its consultative policies to 
robustly include Indigenous perspectives. Given that the judiciary encourages the government to 
find non-legal remedies for Indigenous-settler conflicts, the government faces no restraints to 
developing new consultation protocols that incorporate Indigenous perspectives in a more robust 
manner. Nevertheless, the goal of consultative policies should be to advance good faith efforts of 
reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous interests rather than simply avoiding 
litigation. If the government treated the judiciary’s articulation of the duty to consult as the minimal 
threshold to avoid legal challenges, then the capacity for the duty to consult to engage with 
unresolved constitutional tensions is lost.115 The SCC has stated that governments can avoid the 
charge of failing to consult Indigenous peoples by seeking Indigenous consent before or after 
Aboriginal title is declared.116 This statement enforces the position that robust forms of 
consultation, rather than adopting a minimalist approach, can help the government avoid future 
legal challenges. The SCC appears to be attempting to enforce a more flexible approach to 
consultation that fulfills good faith Indigenous-Crown interactions. However, Indigenous consent 
is only legally required when Aboriginal title is secured. Infringing other forms of Indigenous 
rights, such as Aboriginal rights to specific practices and customs, does not require Indigenous 
consent.   
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The government’s current consultative policy is updated to reflect the development of case 
law up to 2010. In many instances, the policy emphasizes that the legal parameters of the duty to 
consult, as outlined by the courts, must be followed by federal agencies and officials; however, the 
policy also acknowledges that providing additional consultative measures may help build stronger 
relationships with Indigenous communities. As such, the government’s policy strictly adheres to 
legal norms, while allowing officials to exercise discretion when determining whether or not to 
advance more robust forms of consultation. For instance, the policy reiterates the judiciary’s 
decision that Indigenous peoples cannot exercise a veto over the Crown’s proposed project.117 
However, the policy also states that, during consultation, officials should show a willingness to 
reject a proposal or decision.118 The idea of not advancing a Crown proposal was also brought up 
when considering proper accommodation for Indigenous peoples.119 Although the Indigenous 
party may not exercise an explicit veto, the federal government’s policy framework suggests that 
stopping a proposal in its entirety can, in some instances, uphold the Crown’s honour.  
Another example of the government’s discretionary approach lies in the section regarding 
how federal officials should properly document accommodation procedures and measures for both 
federal record keeping and to demonstrate good faith efforts. The SCC’s decision in Little Salmon 
suggests that miscommunication does not breach the duty to consult if the government’s actions 
produce meaningful consultation.120 As such, the government’s policy guidelines state that 
officials may disclose the rationale behind why certain measures of accommodation were not 
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granted to the Indigenous community.121 The language in this section reveals that supplying 
Indigenous peoples with justification for Crown actions is not binding on federal officials. Similar 
language is used to state that federal officials must abide by the federal consultative principles, 
regardless of the protocols made by other Indigenous nations; however, the policy then states that 
it may be conducive to achieving meaningful consultation if federal officials used Indigenous 
standards of consultation as starting points for negotiation.122  
The federal government’s attempt to promote more robust forms of consultation is non-
committal at best. Although the government acknowledges that further initiatives to promote 
meaningful exchanges and participation strengthen Indigenous-Crown relations, there is no 
binding obligation to pursue those initiatives. As such, the federal government’s consultative 
guidelines seek to achieve the minimum threshold outlined by legal norms. Indeed, the 
consultation guidelines’ adherence to minimal legal standards reflects inter-institutional tension. 
The government’s policy preferences and proposals have been seriously curtailed by the SCC’s 
expansion of the duty to consult as a general constitutional framework that guides Indigenous-
Crown constitutional relations. The government may wish to maintain its ability to pursue policy 
preferences by only abiding by minimal legal standards, while preserving broad discretionary 
powers to pursue different consultative processes. However, the government’s resistance against 
judicial constraints may alter the pursuit of meaningful consultation with Indigenous peoples as a 
matter of government discretion rather than a constitutional obligation. Government should 
maintain complete control over policy-making, but the advancement of Indigenous-Crown 
relations should be animated by more than just government preferences. Thus, the government’s 
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consultation policy is another instance in which inter-institutional conflict can become the source 
of increased Indigenous-settler tension.  
Each institution, the judiciary and the government, have their own interpretations of a just 
relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. The different institutional roles and 
expectations provide insightful approaches to how the Crown can uphold its obligation to 
Indigenous peoples. The evolution of the duty to consult demonstrates that the ways in which 
institutions confront constitutional disputes informs how Indigenous-Crown relations develop.  
However, these institutions are also reacting to external influences alongside behaviours and 
actions within institutional systems. The ways in which Indigenous peoples mobilize to trigger 

















Other actors that must respond to different interpretations of Canada’s constitution are 
groups engaging in collective mobilization. Actors that want to initiate social movements articulate 
current disputes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in a manner that advances their 
interests. Similar to institutions, these groups must also frame their actions to appear legitimate to 
other actors and to gain external support. Groups engaging in collective mobilization follow their 
own pattern of behaviours that influence the behaviours of other actors. Indigenous groups 
attempting to initiate a social movement are aspiring to transform major institutional practices. In 
addition to the actions of Canada’s institutional system, the behaviour of Indigenous groups 
participating in social movements is another major source of interactions that inform dialogical 
processes within Indigenous-settler relationships.   
Canadian institutions must interact with, and respond to, contestation between citizens in 
order for their roles and behaviours to match societal expectations. The interaction between 
56 
 
institutions and citizens are fairly routine processes that are often initiated by institutions. For 
instance, the government’s consultation framework was constructed to reflect developing case law, 
but it also attempted to integrate the input of Indigenous peoples’ perspectives on proper 
consultation protocols. However, the institution ultimately decides the extent to which citizen input 
will be incorporated in the final policy. For instance, Indigenous peoples stated that the 
government should move beyond the minimal legal requirements for consultation in order for the 
process to be considered meaningful and legitimate.123 As such, Indigenous peoples suggested 
consultation protocols that went well beyond existing case law, such as using consultation 
processes to address past injustices, treating potential Crown infringements as one part of 
accumulated effects on Indigenous ways of living rather than as an isolated proposal, and devising 
consultation procedures without first attempting to evaluate Indigenous rights claims’ potential 
strength.124 In response to these suggestions, the federal government’s guidelines reflect the 
standards outlined in case law, but also consider the input made by Indigenous peoples as 
recommended actions to take in certain situations.  
The government’s consultation guidelines demonstrate how an institution chooses to react 
to societal contestation in order to continue operating with legitimacy. In this case, the government 
chose to closely follow the legal norms established by the judiciary rather than the opinions of 
Indigenous peoples, who are, ironically, the actors intended to participate in consultation protocols. 
As such, the government secured legitimacy from its actions by closely following the judiciary’s 
standards. The judiciary is thus a part of the coalition of actors that legitimate government actions. 
Since some institutions can legitimate the existence of other institutions within a system, external 
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actors may have little capacity to initiate institutional change. This situation explains the frustration 
experienced by supporters of Indigenous self-determination towards state institutions; each 
institutional decision appears to reinforce other institutional visions of a just relationship, which 
discredits the value of Indigenous perspectives and disempowers Indigenous peoples’ ability to 
speak about their own visions on their own terms.125   
Institutions discriminate against external perspectives, such as Indigenous worldviews, due 
to the ways in which institutions have maintained biases against certain groups.126 These biases 
exist as vestiges of historical processes and values that create flaws and inconsistencies within an 
institution. Institutional biases that systematically discredit the perspectives of certain peoples are 
a fundamental obstacle against the ability for institutions to assess identity claims. Individuals who 
make identity claims are not seeking to pass judgement on different cultural values; rather, they 
are seeking to engage in public deliberation regarding how their cultural values can be respected 
in society.127 Indeed, the act of making claims before institutions reveals a commitment to open 
their claims for debate and further contestation in order for the claim to gain legitimacy among 
society.128 Consequently, when institutions operate with biases that prevent a fair assessment of 
identity claims, rights claimants feel detached and frustrated at the institutional system. For 
instance, Indigenous peoples distrust the institutions responsible for upholding constitutional 
obligations because decision-making outcomes do not adequately consider Indigenous 
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perspectives. Indigenous peoples’ hostile reactions to institutions’ actions jeopardizes future 
attempts at building a meaningful relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.  
The premise that institutions are non-neutral entities is a product of how institutions 
undergo constant change. Consequently, institutions’ incremental adjustments to sustain 
legitimacy according to societal standards contribute to an inability to fairly consider diverse 
visions of how institutions should operate. Institutions can rectify this inability to fairly assess 
identity claims by acknowledging that their positions are often informed by dominant perspectives 
and attitudes.129 Institutions must be prepared to detect previous mistakes in decision-making and 
question underlying assumptions regarding the rights claims of different peoples.130 However, it 
is difficult for institutions to willingly undermine their own actions because institutional legitimacy 
is ultimately determined by dominant perspectives and values. As a result, rights claims can initiate 
the process by which institutions re-evaluate their behaviour and detect injustice towards minority 
values.131 By their nature, institutions do not have internal mechanisms that fundamentally 
challenge institutional behaviours and assumptions. Institutions must take cues to undergo radical 
change from external sources, such as citizens asserting different rights claims.  
Institutions present constraints against citizens mobilizing to assert rights claims because 
those claims often represent demands that undermine the political and social status quo upon which 
institutions rely for legitimacy. Conversely, institutions also present opportunities for citizens to 
mobilize because processes of gradual institutional change can reveal tensions or contradictions 
within and between institutions that are open to contestation from citizens. More opportunities for 
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institutional change emerge when tensions between institutions in a system are overt.132 Citizens 
asserting rights claims strategically interact with institutional opportunities and constraints.  
 
Social Movement Theories 
The political process model is a social movement theory that states citizens engaging in 
collective mobilization use specific patterns of contentious collective action in the face of changing 
opportunity structures.133 This social movement theory stresses the cycle of interactions between 
institutional opportunities and constraints, and citizens’ attempts to agitate for change. As such, 
the ways in which citizens organize or react to institutional constraints and opportunities both 
initiate, and react to, institutions’ actions. The initial actions that began from either citizens or 
institutions are acted upon by future decisions from both parties; as a result, outcomes are 
contingent on the interactions made between citizens and institutions rather than the saliency of 
the normative ideals animating each actor.134 In effect, the exchanges between citizens and 
institutions are path dependent because future actions are shaped by previous decisions. It is 
difficult to precisely distinguish a moment in time in which one actor initiates the exchange. It is 
even difficult to accurately decipher the status quo institutional constraints and opportunities, since 
institutions gradually change and are shaped by the decisions and expectations of citizens. 
Although institutions reflect the attitudes of the dominant society, the shifting coalition of actors 
that sustains institutional legitimacy leaves open the possibility for non-dominant perspectives to 
permeate institutional processes. However, once a group of citizens mobilizes to challenge a 
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dimension of the institutional status quo, the subsequent institutional environment gives rise to a 
different set of conditions than the initial actions of the mobilization.135  
Instead of deciphering the origin of collective mobilization, the political process model 
detects the ways in which citizens develop mobilization strategies in response to institutional 
adjustments. The collective history of a group’s mobilization tactics make up their repertoires of 
contention, which those groups use as resources to agitate for institutional change.136 Indeed, 
various groups can draw on one another’s repertoires in an attempt to pursue their interests. The 
political process model identifies a range of possible contentious actions, such as violence, 
disruption, and convention.137 The ways in which groups use these tactics and the contexts in which 
these actions are taken determine the group’s collective repertoires. For instance, Indigenous 
peoples use all of these strategies to varying degrees of success in certain situations. Indigenous 
peoples use existing political and legal channels to demand institutional change, such as instigating 
legal challenges and participating in forums for policy-making. Alongside these conventional 
methods of demanding for change, Indigenous peoples also use disruptive tactics to gain attention 
towards their demands. Disruption transforms the initial demands to become more urgent, 
providing a valuable opportunity for change to occur. Tactics such as blockading access to key 
destinations and flash-mob protests are forms of disruption employed by Indigenous peoples. 
Violence is used to raise the seriousness of the situation, but it also easily puts at risk the legitimacy 
of the entire movement. The escalation of the Oka Crisis demonstrates that the Mohawks’ armed 
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resistance was treated by Canadian forces as disrespecting law and order.138 All previously used 
practises of contention form the existing repertoire that Indigenous peoples can employ to demand 
further institutional change.  
The contentious activity in and of itself does not meaningfully advance demands for 
institutional change. The ways in which a group strategically frames its contentious actions 
determines the types of opportunities for change that are made available. Indeed, both citizens and 
institutions are locked in a framing contest, as each side attempts to provide a rationale for their 
actions that increases opportunities for their own desired outcome.139 Framing a movement or 
collection of contentious actions involves the usage of existing values and beliefs to make sense 
of a perceived injustice and how that injustice can be rectified; as such, the framing of a movement 
should resonate between the members of the group seeking change, the institutions that are sought 
after to initiate change, and other bystanders that could become allies or which are already allies.140 
Although a movement’s framing will depend on the political context, frames also overemphasize 
the ability to enact successful change in order to maximize existing opportunity structures.141 
Optimism regarding the ability to take action resonates across many different actors, but other 
values and attitudes that resonate are often difficult to use as frames because actors have unequal 
access to the discourse and ideas of different values.142 In this way, framing contentious actions 
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becomes a technique; marginalized peoples must be able to choose powerful frames that both 
persuade the attitudes of external actors and resonate with internal members that have their own 
visions of justice that are contrary to the understandings and perspectives of dominant institutional 
processes.  
Citizens also must consider the constantly evolving political opportunities and constraints 
when determining the framing of their contentious actions. The frame enables actors to make sense 
of how their actions are connected to the type of institutional change that is made possible through 
an opportunity structure. The political process model identifies new access to power, changing 
alignments of power, new allies, and cleavages among elites as four main dimensions of 
opportunity structures.143 In the context of Indigenous-settler relations, these types of opportunity 
structures alter depending on the current political discourse and issues. The evolution of the duty 
to consult reveals that the judiciary’s legal norms are changing the parameters of considering when 
the duty is triggered and the actions that constitute proper consultation. As a result, the 
government’s consultation policy framework does not provide an incentive for federal officials to 
pursue consultation strategies that are beyond minimum legal standards. The institutional 
constraints reside in how new case law may limit the scope of the duty to consult, which then act 
as standards to construct federal policy. Access to power appears to be closed because the duty to 
consult has evolved to close several possibilities for empowering Indigenous peoples. Although 
the government’s policy preferences are hindered by judicial decisions, each institution remains 
relatively stable because both are committed to upholding a vision of consultation that is not 
independent from the assertion of Crown sovereignty. As such, power alignments are sustained 
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and elites are not entirely divided because consultation is understood as a right flowing from the 
Canadian constitutional order, rather than a right from a separate sovereign entity.144 Furthermore, 
it is difficult to gain additional allies because the duty to consult is a right only applied to the 
government’s classification of Aboriginal peoples.  
Nevertheless, the judiciary’s and the government’s decision to leave the terms and 
definition of appropriate consultation to context-specific situations145 presents an opportunity for 
Indigenous peoples to form their own conditions for meaningful consultation. The political 
opportunity emerges because of the existence of the duty to consult as a uniquely Aboriginal right. 
The existence of rights opens some access to power because the nature and scope of a right is 
subject to contestation. Although institutions have provided their understanding of the scope and 
nature of the duty to consult, the rights-holders are empowered to contest the justice of those 
interpretations. Indigenous peoples can use the ambiguous definition and expectations regarding 
the duty to consult as a framework to advance broader Indigenous demands such as the right to 
have their perspectives treated with respect. Indigenous peoples can transform the institutional 
system’s understanding of the duty to consult to capture Indigenous peoples’ perspectives, thereby 
revealing the current injustice of the status quo arrangement. Indeed, the inclusion of Indigenous 
visions may expose how the institutional system’s behaviour prevents Indigenous peoples from 
participating and interacting with institutions in a fair manner.146 Thus, Indigenous peoples must 
frame their contentious action to incorporate both the discourse of institutional interpretations of 
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the duty to consult with Indigenous perspectives. As a result, the contentious action will 
meaningfully represent a persuasive frame between both institutions and Indigenous participants.  
 
Case Study Examination of Social Movements 
A case study analysis of two salient protest movements will reveal how Indigenous peoples 
mobilize against undesirable institutional actions, and the institutional system’s reactions to those 
external shocks. These movements were chosen because they involve Indigenous peoples agitating 
against the status quo understanding of the duty to consult. Furthermore, these movements have 
occurred within the timeframe of the case law developments regarding the duty to consult. The 
timing of the protests is significant because the resistance against the terms and conditions of the 
duty to consult must reflect the institutional system’s evolving interpretations. Moreover, choosing 
politically salient movements indicates that the political situation in which the protests occurred 
was urgent. In critical situations, the decisions of actors, both resistors and institutions, are made 
seriously, and thus faithfully represents the true behaviour or each actor. Each of the protests are 
not in and of themselves a social movement. However, the political process model can still be 
applied because each case represents the broader movement of advancing Indigenous rights. The 
case study analysis will extensively examine each protest movement within the specific boundaries 
of the political context from which the protests emerge, as well as place the specific protest within 
the broader Indigenous rights social movement. The emergence of Idle No More and the Rexton 
Shale Gas protests will be analyzed.  
 
Case Study 1: Idle No More  
The Idle No More movement initially began as a response to the government’s budget, 
called Bill C-45, which was first tabled in October 18, 2012. The budget was an omnibus bill, 
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which outlined the government’s fiscal policy as well as proposing changes to existing statutes. 
The changes that concerned Indigenous peoples were the proposal to amend the Navigable Waters 
Protection Act and the Indian Act. The proposed changes to the Navigable Waters Protection Act 
would limit the necessity of federal approval for businesses to construct infrastructure “in, on, 
over, under, through or across any minor water.”147 The proposal also affects the assessment of 
pipelines and interprovincial power lines, because environmental assessment hearings would not 
consider how those utilities would affect any water in Canada.148 However, the proposal was 
formulated without prior consultation with Indigenous communities that rely on Canada’s water 
systems for both navigation and cultural purposes.149 Furthermore, the proposed changes to the 
Indian Act would allow First Nations to expedite the process to surrender a band’s territory by 
only requiring a majority of votes from those in attendance of a band meeting or referendum rather 
than a majority of eligible voters.150 The changes are meant to facilitate Indigenous peoples to 
“create economic opportunity and prosperity for their communities,”151 but the proposal did not 
consult different Indigenous communities that may benefit from different land designating 
procedures.152 The government was directly criticized for failing to honour their duty to consult 
Indigenous peoples regarding the proposed amendments in the two Acts on one occasion during 
the second reading of the Bill.153  
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Four women in Saskatchewan, Jessica Gordon, Sheelah McLean, Sylvia McAdam and 
Nina Wilson, organized an event in Saskatoon to debate the Bill’s capacity to erode Indigenous 
rights; they called their meeting “Idle No More.”154 Soon, the meeting in Saskatoon spread, 
culminating in the movement’s organization of a National Day of Action in various locations one 
month after the initial meeting on November 10, 2012.155 The movement protested against the 
proposals in Bill C-45, and pledged to agitate against future proposals that “erode treaty and 
Indigenous rights and the rights of all Canadians.”156 The movement promotes a constitutional 
vision in which honouring Indigenous sovereignty will protect the lands and waters for all peoples 
of Canada.157 The Idle No More movement supports the notion that Indigenous sovereignty is 
respected by implementing a nation-to-nation treaty relationship, in which honouring the spirit of 
past treaty agreements forms the basis of Indigenous rights over land and resources.158  
However, the content of the proposals in Bill C-45 was not the only factor in the 
movement’s call for a new constitutional relationship. The movement states that a lack of 
consultation with Indigenous peoples is an additional source of anger against the government, as 
it appears to demonstrate the government’s flagrant disregard for Indigenous perspectives.159 This 
argument follows that if the government appropriately consulted Indigenous peoples regarding the 
proposed changes in Bill C-45, those proposals would never be tabled in Parliament. Thus, 
breaching Indigenous people’s standards of the duty to consult prompted a sense of urgency to 
begin a new conversation regarding the nature of Indigenous-settler relations. For instance, the 
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chief of Attawapiskat, Theresa Spence, announced her decision to start a hunger strike on the 
National Day of Action event in Ottawa to pressure a meeting with the Prime Minister and 
Governor General.160 Spence already gained national attention for demanding the government to 
address the housing crisis in Attawapiskat a year before, and the Idle No More protests were an 
additional platform to demand changes in her community. Spence’s actions and the broader Idle 
No More Movement reveal how Indigenous peoples use the duty to consult as an attempt to begin 
a conversation regarding a new constitutional relationship. This strategy complies with the 
understanding that consultation, as a dimension of s. 35 constitutional protection, can serve as a 
platform for meaningful Indigenous-Crown exchanges. But rather than launching a legal challenge 
to determine whether the duty to consult can affect Crown actions, the participants of Idle No More 
chose to use the terminology of consultation while instilling their own understanding of proper 
consultation protocols, such as direct meetings with the Prime Minister and Governor General. 
The movement is attempting to reclaim a space for Indigenous perceptions of proper consultation, 
while showing the injustice of the current institutional understanding.  
Bill C-45 was passed to the committee stage and received more criticisms for the lack of 
consultation with Indigenous peoples regarding legislation directly affecting their livelihoods.161 
Some members of Parliament explicitly called on the government to uphold its constitutional 
obligation to consult Indigenous peoples, as mandated by the judiciary.162 These demands reveal 
that some actors in government accept an understanding of the duty to consult that surpasses the 
minimalist approach employed by the government. Indeed, these demands are consistent with the 
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federal government’s consultation framework, which states that in certain contexts, fulfilling other 
consultative protocols will help build stronger relationships with Indigenous communities.163 
Similar to the Indigenous protesters, members of Parliament have different understandings and 
interpretations for the same discourse regarding the duty to consult. For instance, Minister of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development John Duncan responded to Spence’s actions by 
stating that he is open to the possibility of meeting with her because the government respects direct 
negotiations with First Nations leaders; a spokesperson for his ministry also stated that the 
government respects the duty to consult, and consults Aboriginal people 5000 times every year.164 
Despite the opposition to the proposals and the Idle No More protests, the Conservative majority 
government passed Bill C-45 on December 14, 2012.     
The Idle No More protesters did not lessen their resolve to protect their rights, which are 
claimed to be violated by Bill C-45.165 The forms of protest also evolved, including acts of 
petitioning specific members of Parliament, holding peaceful rallies and marches, flash-mob style 
protests in public spaces, and blockades in city centres and railways.166 The perceived lack of 
consultation on the part of the government deepened the resolve among Indigenous peoples that 
respecting the original treaty relationships is the necessary step to ensuring Indigenous interests 
and rights are protected.167 In effect, the demand for proper consultation is used synonymously by 
Indigenous peoples as honouring sacred treaty agreements. For Indigenous peoples, the issue of 
adequate consultation is one dimension of the broader goal of respecting Indigenous peoples’ 
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autonomy. Conversely, the government maintains its position that consultation has been 
respected.168 Although acts of civil disobedience were escalating, the government did not change 
its position on the parameters of adequate consultation beyond the existing legal norms.  
When the government agreed to meet First Nations leaders, neither party could agree on 
the terms of how the working meeting would proceed. Many Indigenous leaders expressed their 
commitment to withdraw from the meeting if the Governor General was not present, and were 
concerned about the location of the meeting.169 The government was criticized as being “very 
dictatorial and unrelenting” because of the insistence that the meeting should be held in the Prime 
Minister’s office without the Governor General.170 Some leaders in the Assembly of First Nations 
were willing to engage with the Prime Minister under the government’s terms of the meeting, but 
division existed between Indigenous leaders whether the meeting should proceed. The situation 
reveals that the institutions’ understanding of the duty to consult does not bind government 
behaviour to properly anticipate negative responses from Indigenous peoples.171  
The government only reacts to specific challenges to status quo constitutional 
arrangements. In this case, the government even attempted to maintain discretionary power to 
control the meeting’s agenda, such as the participants and the location of the meeting, despite the 
admission that a meeting to re-examine Indigenous concerns was necessary. The government 
incurs a negative reaction from Indigenous peoples when the government misjudges the timing to 
introduce and implement proactive consultation measures. Indeed, the entire Idle No More 
movement can be interpreted as a product of the government’s miscalculation regarding when 
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robust forms of consultation should take place. The Idle No More protesters continued their acts 
of civil disobedience after the working meeting took place between some AFN Chiefs and the 
Prime Minister.172 The protesters were in a unique position because they were able to maintain 
pressure against the government and First Nations chiefs to re-engage on issues of respecting treaty 
rights.173 The working meeting resulted with the government making some commitments to 
expedite the advancement of Indigenous interests. For instance, the government articulated a clear 
mandate to outline processes for treaty implementation.174 Nevertheless, the working meeting did 
not fully respect Indigenous terms of proper engagement and consultation. Consequently, 
Indigenous leaders drafted their own declaration that outlined their demands, such as meeting with 
the Prime Minister, Governor General, and provincial leaders to discuss a new Indigenous-Crown 
relationship.175 The declaration also states that the government must seek Indigenous peoples’ 
consent when their “inherent or treaty rights,” may be affected.176  
The demand for the government to seek Indigenous consent was completely at odds with 
the legal norms that guide the procedural and substantive elements of meeting the requirements of 
consultation at that time. The declaration reveals a vast difference between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous perspectives regarding proper consultation protocols. Although the Idle No More 
movement was not successful in reversing Bill C-45,177 it exposed the necessity for Indigenous-
Crown relations to be re-evaluated. Each party holds extremely different expectations regarding 
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core dimensions of the Indigenous-Crown constitutional relationship, such as how consultation 
should proceed in a fair manner. However, a meeting was not convened after the declaration was 
made public, although Idle No More protesters continued to rally across the country. It is unclear 
whether a meeting could be convened at all, considering the tension created between Indigenous 
leaders and the government when the location and participants of the previous working meeting 
were contested. It may be difficult to arrange a meaningful meeting between the government and 
Indigenous leaders in the future because the terms of proper consultation are heavily disputed. 
Indeed, the debate regarding the standards of proper consultation in policy-making has uncovered 
a profound absence of clear standards on how to make Indigenous-Crown interactions meaningful 
and fair. The SCC has stated that seeking Indigenous consent may be the most certain strategy for 
the government to avoid legal challenges regarding the duty to consult;178 nevertheless, this 
statement is consistent with the government’s use of their discretion to conduct Indigenous-Crown 
relations. As the experience of Idle No More suggests, relying solely on discretion to judge the 
course of Indigenous-Crown interactions can lead to the deterioration of Indigenous-Crown 
relations that are difficult to ameliorate.   
The protests also gained some non-Indigenous support since the claim that Bill C-45 lacked 
proper consultation appealed to the public’s democratic sensibilities.179 The way in which 
Indigenous peoples framed their mobilization as a response to a lack of consultation also helped 
gain non-Indigenous allies who were also concerned about the government’s omnibus bills. Non-
Indigenous peoples can understand why circumventing consultation is an affront to democratic 
ideals and reflects poor policy-making, because consultation is a dimension of existing 
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administrative laws governing procedural fairness.180 It is less certain if non-Indigenous 
participants in Idle No More support a nation-to-nation relationship guided by treaty rights. An 
online Nanos Research Poll conducted over two days revealed that a majority of Canadians 
participating in the survey did not view the Idle No More protests favourably, with 45.5% stating 
they had a “negative or somewhat negative impression.”181 This poll suggests that Indigenous 
peoples have not yet gained allies that wholly support Indigenous visions of a just constitutional 
relationship. Non-Indigenous peoples appear concerned when government acts unreasonably 
towards Indigenous interests when it signals that interests from other citizens may be unfairly 
ignored. Other than the administrative fairness dimension of the duty to consult, the demands of 
Idle No More participants regarding Indigenous rights do not appear to resonate with other peoples.  
Idle No More continues its efforts to advance a new relationship guided by the original 
treaties by applying strategies for long-term institutional change. The participants of the movement 
organize workshops that educate Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples about treaty rights and 
contemporary Indigenous concerns. The workshops are called “teach-ins,” and the education of 
citizens is a strategy to influence a new generation of political actors that will affect the political 
coalitions that supply legitimacy to institutions. The movement demonstrates flexibility to pursue 
multiple paths for institutional change, despite the government’s unwillingness to change past 
legislation such as Bill C-45.182 Although the movement was unsuccessful at reversing Bill C-45, 
it was highly successful in raising awareness of Indigenous constitutional demands in relation to 
respecting Indigenous rights to fair consultation.   
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Case Study 2: The Rexton Shale Gas protests  
The Rexton Shale Gas protests were a series of confrontations between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous protesters, the New Brunswick government, and SWN Resources. The New 
Brunswick government’s agenda to explore the possibility of shale gas production is contested by 
the citizens who are concerned that shale gas production could irrevocably harm the environment 
and their ways of life. On November 29, 2011, some residents of New Brunswick appealed to their 
government to completely stop plans for shale gas development. For instance, a petition with 
almost 16,000 signatures asking for the government to end shale gas development was tabled in 
the legislature by Kirk MacDonald, a Progressive Conservative MLA.183 However, MacDonald 
later voted in support of a non-binding resolution to advance shale gas exploration in the province 
despite the presence of the petition.184 The process by which the government is advancing its 
agenda is a critical factor in the demands for withdrawing plans for shale gas exploration. The 
petition states that the government has expedited processes to explore the possibility of shale gas 
production without formal public inquiries.185 This statement reveals that the lack of public 
consultation is perceived as rendering illegitimate the entire mandate for a shale gas sector.  
Almost two years later, on September 30, 2013, Indigenous and non-Indigenous protesters 
decided to directly obstruct the advancement of shale gas exploration. They erected a blockade 
that prevented SWN Resources, who were given licenses by the New Brunswick government to 
explore the potential for gas and oil,186 from accessing key highways and equipment. The 
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protesters claimed that the blockade was a last resort to stop their government from pursuing a 
mandate that does not reflect the demands of New Brunswick citizens.187 The Elsipogtog First 
Nation community perceived the government’s seemingly unilateral actions to advance the shale 
gas industry as “the last straw” that needed to be resisted.188 The Elsipogtog First Nation Chief 
delivered an eviction notice to SWN Resources, and stated that the band council will pass a 
resolution to reclaim unoccupied reserve lands to prevent fracking companies and the government 
from continuing exploration.189 Besides the complete removal of SWN Resources from the land 
and the discontinuation of shale gas exploration, the protesters also demanded a meeting with the 
provincial government.190 The non-Indigenous participants supported the Elsipogtog First Nation 
Chief’s demands insofar that it would prevent SWN Resources from continuing their work, and 
stop the government from pursuing shale gas production without proper public consultation.191 By 
focusing on the goals of maintaining transparency in policy-making and protecting the 
environment, the Elsipogtog peoples were successful in framing their objectives to gain non-
Indigenous allies.  
SWN Resources responded by successfully applying for a court injunction to remove the 
protesters from barring access to their equipment.192 The Court decided that the protesters had a 
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right to express their opinions as long as they did not affect SWN Resources from conducting their 
work.193 The protesters did not remove the barricades, with some stating that the assertion of treaty 
rights and Aboriginal rights supersedes the Court’s injunction.194 Premier David Alward responded 
to the protests by stating he will continue to welcome meetings with First Nations, but that no 
meeting will be convened as long as protesters are “breaking the law.”195 Nevertheless, talks did 
occur between the government and the Elsipogtog Chief Aaron Sock, which resulted in a 
commitment to establish a working group to fully address the concerns of the Elsipogtog 
peoples.196  The meeting between Premier Alward and the Elsipogtog Chief was important to 
maintaining communication, but it also demonstrated how consultation alone does not guarantee 
negotiations. Indeed, the meeting established the wide divide between the government’s insistence 
that their mandate will be pursued, and the Elsipogtog people’s commitment to prevent that 
mandate from advancing.197 Consequently, the protests continued to escalate because the 
government was not reconsidering its decision to allow SWN Resources to perform seismic 
testing. For instance, the New Brunswick ombudsman, who attempted to mediate between the 
interests of government and protesters, did not have the authority to overturn the government’s 
policy mandate.198 The protests continued because consultation without the possibility of 
overturning the decision to pursue shale gas exploration appeared to ignore the seriousness of the 
protesters’ interests. Similar to the Idle No More movement, the original demands for consultation 
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transformed into demands for long-term commitments to address broader Indigenous-Crown 
relationships.199  
SWN Resources successfully gained an extension to their original injunction,200 which was 
then enforced by the RCMP. The exchange between the RCMP and protesters ended in violence, 
with five police vehicles burned and forty people, including the Elsipogtog Chief, arrested.201 The 
RCMP claimed that weapons were hidden at the protest site, making it necessary to act against the 
non-peaceful protesters.202 Indigenous leaders reiterated their demands by stating the 
government’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples is backed up by SCC decisions.203 Indeed, the 
Elsipogtog peoples demand proper consultation to define future Indigenous-Crown relations to 
address other concerns facing the Elsipogtog community; the community has expressed their 
opposition to the current consultation procedure because they need more resources to understand 
how the industry will affect their rights.204 The federal consultation policy states that funding 
Indigenous communities may be necessary to facilitate meaningful consultation.205 The available 
funding is used to support a number of tasks that make consultation meaningful, including research 
and development, which is the concern of the Elsipogtog peoples.206 However, the federal policy 
makes funding available for the Indigenous community after it has constructed consultation 
protocols based on the strength of Indigenous rights claims. This process is contrary to the demands 
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of the Elsipogtog peoples, because they perceive the exclusion of Indigenous input at the earliest 
stages of consultation as undermining good faith efforts at consultation.  
Despite the escalation in violence between the protesters and RCMP, the government and 
Elsipogtog Chief agreed that shale gas exploration would be suspended during a “cooling off 
period,” in which consultation can take place between Indigenous and non-Indigenous leaders.207 
However, in the aftermath of the protests, the Elsipogtog peoples turned away from negotiations 
with government in order to pursue land claims. The Elsipogtog Chief stated that owning the land 
is the surest route to protecting their rights.208 Additionally, the government expressed its 
commitment to advance a shale gas sector in New Brunswick, with the Premier stating that the 
“personal agendas of the minority” will not be a “roadblock to developing [New Brunswick’s] 
bright future.”209  
This outcome demonstrates that a failure to meaningfully pursue consultation with 
Indigenous peoples at the early stage of decision-making may lead to more confrontations in the 
future that become harder to settle through negotiations. Moreover, the land claims process to 
determine Indigenous ownership of land is slow, while the government has already given licenses 
for companies to drill wells.210 As such, there is a high probability that future confrontations will 
occur between Indigenous peoples attempting to assert their rights and the government advancing 
their agenda. Indigenous peoples can legally demand consultation if they pursue land claims 
because it obliges the government to take seriously their prima facie rights claims. Government 
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must consult Indigenous peoples when they have knowledge of Indigenous rights claims.211 Thus, 
future confrontations between the New Brunswick government and the Elsipogtog peoples may 
be observed in court rather than through civil disobedience. Engaging in legal challenges to 
determine the parameters of appropriate consultation may be the only recourse to settling 
Indigenous-Crown disputes.212 The experience of the Rexton Shale Gas protests demonstrates that 
the duty to consult as a guiding principle for Indigenous-Crown relations does not motivate 
government to act beyond minimum legal requirements. As such, the Elsipogtog peoples have 
decided to engage in land claims to enhance the Crown’s legal obligations to the Indigenous 
community.  
The Rexton Shale Gas protesters were also reacting to a third party in addition to the 
government’s actions. SWN Resources were legitimately given licenses to explore the possibility 
for shale gas production, regardless of whether the government adequately addressed public 
concerns. As such, SWN Resources were successful in their application for an injunction. 
However, the protesters claimed that preventing SWN Resources from performing their jobs was 
the only recourse they had to demand a meeting with the government.213 Although the judiciary 
had to respect the loss of SWN Resources, forcing the protesters to remove their barricades did not 
entail a legal obligation for the government to address the demands of the protesters.  Indeed, if 
the protesters had not applied adequate pressure by sustaining the blockades, the government may 
not have been willing to engage with their concerns. Third parties can play an important role in 
consultation because they have information regarding a proposed project that is valuable to 
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determining possible measures of accommodation.214 The experience of the Rexton Shale Gas 
protests reveals that the mere presence of third parties can undermine the perception of good faith 
negotiations because it appears as though the Crown proposal cannot be reversed. Clear 
communication, which is a key factor in consultation processes, would have clarified the role of 
SWN Resources in relation to fulfilling the duty to consult.  
Third parties like SWN Resources can fulfill the Crown’s duty to consult if they are given 
the proper mandate and resources,215 but this mandate was not given because the exploration 
project was not considered by the government as necessitating Indigenous participation in 
decision-making; the government claimed it followed the legal norms of treating consultation as a 
“sliding scale,” in which exploration of possible resources only involved giving adequate notice 
to Indigenous peoples that testing was occurring.216 The government stated that the scope of 
consultation would change if shale gas development proceeds in the future.217 Although the 
government’s actions are legally defensible, their decision to treat obligations to consult as 
minimum legal requirements blinded the government to consider how exploration was viewed as 
illegitimate by Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Indeed, the government’s restrictive 
approach to consultation is viewed by Indigenous peoples as contrary to their perceptions of just 
dealings.218 If the government conducted more robust forms of consultation, they may have been 
able to better balance dividing interests regarding shale gas development. Showing a stronger 
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effort to respect the interests of citizens who opposed shale gas exploration may have also 
prevented the protests from occurring.  
The emergence of Idle No More and the Rexton Shale Gas protests illustrate how 
Indigenous peoples react to decisions made by existing institutional systems regarding appropriate 
levels of consultation. In both instances, the government advanced its policy mandates without 
consulting Indigenous peoples beyond the requirements outlined in existing case law. In particular, 
the New Brunswick government asserted that more substantive forms of consultation would occur 
if their project was advanced. Indigenous communities perceived a lack of consultation at the 
earliest stages of decision-making as undermining good faith efforts to respect Indigenous 
interests. In the context of Idle No More, the proposed amendments affecting Indigenous peoples 
were already drafted without Indigenous consultation.219 As such, the institutional system does not 
promote a vision of consultation in which consultation is the first step to including Indigenous 
perspectives in decision-making. Rather, appropriate levels of consultation are determined after 
the Crown proposal is fully articulated.220 However, the Crown proposal itself may be the subject 
of Indigenous contestation. Consequently, Indigenous peoples react strongly against government 
actions that appear to disrespect the spirit of consultation. By protesting, Indigenous peoples are 
reasserting their right to participate on their own terms by asserting their interests outside of 
institutional channels.  
No clear resolutions were presented after either protest movement were concluded. The 
Idle No More movement continues to organize rallies and education sessions in an effort to 
maintain the collective organizational capacity to pursue future protests. The Indigenous peoples 
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who participated in the Rexton Shale Gas protests have chosen to pursue land claims to definitively 
settle their authority to determine future land use. These outcomes demonstrate that disrespecting 
the terms of consultation for one party will further strain Indigenous-Crown relations, and 
jeopardizes the goal of reconciliation. Indigenous peoples’ acts of contentious collective action 
were made in response to institutions’ initial decision to exclude Indigenous perspectives in the 
early stages of decision-making. Those contentious acts present a new context that determines the 
character of future Indigenous-Crown interactions. Consequently, new opportunities and 
constraints present sites for future contestation between Indigenous peoples and institutional 
systems. Based on the citizen-institution interaction in the two case studies, disruptive protests and 
litigation appear to be the mechanisms in which Indigenous peoples will challenge future 

















Indigenous-Crown constitutional relationships are affected by processes of institutional 
change and social movements (see Figure 1). These two processes are themselves in a dialogical 
relationship with each other. Social movements use Indigenous-settler contestation to frame the 
necessity for institutional change. Institutional systems react to external pressures that are triggered 
by both the systemic Indigenous-settler contestation that is characteristic of Canada’s 
constitutional order and new forces of confrontation organized by mobilizing groups. The 
outcomes of the interaction between institutional change and social movements influence the 
development of Indigenous-settler relationships in a feedback loop. The actions of groups and 
institutional systems address current Indigenous-settler contestation. The outcomes of those 
interactions then create a new context in which the perception of Indigenous-settler contestation is 
altered. This new understanding of Indigenous-settler contestation informs the character of groups’ 
and institutions’ future activities. Actors operating within groups or institutional systems must 
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make decisions that consider previous interactions and anticipate possible reactions from external 
forces. This feedback loop develops both Indigenous-settler relationships and the relationship 
between mobilization and institutional change. As such, the transformations between Indigenous-
settler relationships resemble a system of interconnected relationships and exchanges that are 
recognized within the Canadian constitutional order. Indeed, Canada’s tradition of gradual 
constitutional change sets the expectation that Indigenous-settler relationships are also open to 
contestation through the relationships and exchanges between actors. Thus, the unique character 
of Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships is established by the particular interactions made 
within the system of groups and institutions.  
 





The interactions between different forces and actors within the overall system of 
Indigenous-settler relationships possess different characteristics because they achieve different 
results. Together, these interactions influence each other to produce outcomes that alter the entire 
system in a manner resembling a feedback loop. The actions of actors at the macro level, such as 
mobilizing groups and institutions, must affect the perceptions of individual actors at the micro 
level; when individual perceptions are altered, those individuals’ behaviours accumulate to effect 
change at the macro level.221 For example, the outcomes of Indigenous-Crown interactions may 
shift Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals’ perceptions of a just constitutional relationship. 
When a new context of a just Indigenous-settler relationship emerges, individual actors will behave 
within their macro level roles, such as within groups or institutions, in a different manner. For 
instance, individuals’ different behaviour may modify the coalition of actors that legitimate 
institutions, or interpret the necessity of a social movement in a different perspective. However, 
interactions between actors may not dramatically change existing behaviours. Without altering 
micro level actors’ actions, the character of Indigenous-settler relationships will appear static. As 
such, a feedback loop process does not guarantee that interactions will produce gradual macro 
level changes. Indeed, through the feedback loop, actors who avoid participating in interactions 
with other actors may entrench obstacles to building meaningful relationships in the future. 
Attaining changes within systems of relationships, such as Indigenous-settler relationships, require 
all actors to robustly participate in meaningful exchanges.  
The aim of Idle No More and the Rexton Shale Gas protests was to change how 
consultation was practiced with Indigenous peoples to respect constitutional standards of fairness. 
Changing the practice of consultation involves influencing the individual perceptions of that 
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practice. The movements sought to contest the status quo understanding of appropriate 
consultation by revealing the ways in which the current system promoted injustices. As such, both 
movements framed their demands for altering the practices of consultation as consistent with 
protecting the democratic principles that underpin the importance of consultation, such a 
procedural fairness. If individual actors accept the new understanding of the disputed practice, then 
they will adjust their behaviour to reflect the new protocols. However, changing individual 
perceptions often resembles gradual change. The extent to which Idle No More and the Rexton 
Shale Gas protests have influenced individual attitudes remains unclear. Indeed, the goal to 
transform individual attitudes remains as new sites of contestation and protest emerge. 
Consequently, the process between macro-micro-macro level changes is not clearly separated into 
different phases that operate linearly. Rather, the transition between macro and micro level 
interactions operates alongside one another. In many situations, macro level actors behave 
differently before the perceptions of micro level actors are completely transformed. The 
experiences of Idle No More and the Rexton Shale Gas protests most significantly changed how 
Indigenous peoples will respond to institutional decisions that disrespect the duty to consult. This 
change at the micro level will have repercussions for future group mobilization, and it occurred 
despite how other micro level perspectives, such as non-Indigenous peoples, may not have been 
transformed.222   
The two protest movements’ interaction with the institutional system also influence future 
Indigenous-Crown exchanges. The interactions made by both groups and institutions shape the 
character of future exchanges, thereby also narrowing the availability of alternative outcomes. As 
                                                          




such, Indigenous-Crown relationships evolve according to the path dependent character of 
previous interactions. Indigenous peoples are currently resisting the Enbridge’s Northern Gateway 
oil tanker and pipeline project. This pipeline project represents a major confrontation in which the 
Crown’s duty to consult will be evaluated by Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors. The strategies 
and experiences of Idle No More and the Rexton Shale Gas protests will affect how Indigenous 
peoples and institutions assess Enbridge’s proposed pipeline project. The Northern Gateway 
pipeline is in its early planning phases, but already faces intense opposition from First Nations 
communities. Similar to the outcome of the Rexton Shale Gas protests, Indigenous peoples are 
mobilizing resources to launch a legal challenge against the Crown223 in addition to organizing 
collective acts of resistance.224  
For instance, the Joint Review Panel evaluated Enbridge’s proposal and stated that 
Enbridge’s process of consultation was adequate, 225 despite how many Indigenous peoples did not 
participate because they disagreed with the proposal and the consultation protocols.226 As a result, 
the Gitga'at First Nation legally challenged the Joint Review Panel for insufficiently considering 
the evidence that evaluated the loss of the Indigenous peoples’ ways of life beyond the adverse 
effects to specific ecosystems or resources.227 This situation reinforces the notion that when 
Indigenous peoples do not agree with the terms of consultation processes, their only recourse is to 
seek judicial remedies.228 Indeed, the institutional system does not offer another viable alternative 
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for Indigenous peoples to challenge the established parameters of consultation. However, the 
government interprets challenges to resource projects as resembling special interest groups unduly 
delaying public hearing processes and then resorting to litigation to subvert the proposals of a 
representative democracy.229 The tension within the institutional system to condemn the use of 
legal challenges while not presenting alternative channels for articulating disagreements places the 
prospects for reconciling Indigenous and Crown interests at risk.  
Similar to the outcome of the Rexton Shale Gas protests, Indigenous nations in British 
Columbia may undergo land claims to expand the parameters of appropriate consultation by 
requiring the government to seek explicit consent from the affected Indigenous nation. Once 
Indigenous peoples secure Aboriginal title, the government must seek consent from the Indigenous 
nation, or justify their proposal in a manner that is consistent with the principles of s. 35.230 Before 
the SCC explicitly stated the requirement of consent when Aboriginal Title is concerned, the 
government has relied on the absence of an Indigenous veto to legitimate its mandate.231 The SCC 
decision has further reinforced Indigenous peoples’ use of litigation to demand more decision-
making powers. Although the adversarial nature of the judicial system may exacerbate Indigenous-
Crown tensions because clear “winners” and “losers” are identifiable, pursuing legal challenges is 
consistent with Indigenous peoples’ existing repertoires of contentious action. Indigenous peoples 
seek to change the protocols and expectations that are practiced by the current institutional system. 
Securing this change may then usher a transformation in attitude, in which Indigenous peoples are 
treated as equal partners because their interests are protected and legitimated by the institutional 
system.   
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Since Idle No More, Indigenous peoples have also learned new, effective practices of 
collective action. The grassroots collective action represented by Idle No More peacefully 
demonstrated Indigenous people’s perception of the illegitimacy of institutions’ behaviours, and 
maintained pressure against institutional systems to provoke change. Due to the support for Idle 
No More amongst different Indigenous communities across the country, the experiences and 
capacity to effectively organize and execute contentious actions remain a powerful memory within 
the collective consciousness of many First Nations peoples. Indigenous people have always 
attempted to resist injustices by state institutions. Nevertheless, Idle No More significantly 
transformed the role of grassroots participation as a central element to a legitimate movement that 
represents the positions of Indigenous peoples. These characteristics are apparent in collective acts 
organized by Indigenous peoples in response to the Enbridge Northern Gateway project. So far, 
Indigenous peoples have participated in events that address the dangers of the pipeline project,232 
communicate the interests of British Columbian First Nations nation-wide,233 and protest against 
the pipeline project through public rallies.234 Moreover, Indigenous peoples are also using their 
legal traditions to ban tankers and pipelines from the tar sands from entering their territories.235 
Indigenous peoples are exhibiting a new resolve that is deeply rooted within their communities to 
assert their rights. This determination at the grassroots level will affect future Indigenous-Crown 
interactions.  
 
Implications of the Indigenous-settler Feedback Loop  
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Indigenous-Crown relations are tense as the future of the Enbridge Northern Gateway 
project remains uncertain. The institutional system, in particular the government, will struggle to 
understand and properly react to Indigenous peoples’ demands and actions if it does not consider 
the ways in which Indigenous resistance is in dialogue with institutional change. The experiences 
of Idle No More and the Rexton Shale Gas protests illustrate the exchanges between the actions of 
groups and institutions. The result of those exchanges alters the character of Indigenous-Crown 
relations. As such, the institutional system must address new confrontations with Indigenous 
peoples in a manner that considers preceding developments and experiences.  The government 
cannot treat Indigenous demands in isolation of broader issues within Indigenous-Crown relations. 
When Indigenous peoples are contesting the terms of consultation, the government too quickly 
dismisses these criticisms as showing bad faith towards the consultative process or as a strategy to 
undermine Crown proposals. In effect, the government is treating Indigenous peoples’ criticisms 
in a manner that ignores the Crown’s unique relationship with Indigenous peoples and the 
development of that relationship over time. These actions represent a failure of certain actors, such 
as those that make up the Crown, to meaningfully engage with other actors in the system of 
Indigenous-settler relationships. Ignoring how Indigenous actors frame their current demands in 
relation to previous experiences directs the feedback loop process to resist changing the character 
of Indigenous-settler relationships.  
In addition to overlooking the path dependent nature of Indigenous-Crown relations, the 
institutional system does not provide clear institutionalized arenas to contest distinct visions of 
consultation. Consequently, the parties will rely on crisis situations to meaningfully engage with 
alternative interpretations of proper consultation. If the government waits for crisis situations 
before acting upon Indigenous peoples demands, it is strategic for Indigenous peoples to organize 
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contentious actions to elicit government action. However, both parties’ overreliance on crises to 
initiate meaningful Indigenous-Crown exchanges will make it more difficult to reach 
compromises. The government insufficiently addresses the underlying values or practices attached 
to Indigenous peoples’ perceptions of fair consultation because they are preoccupied with pursing 
their resource extraction mandate. Similarly, Indigenous peoples are not in a position to 
compromise because they want to maximize the opportunity to make as many gains as possible, 
including exercising some control over resource extraction on their lands. Rather than emphasizing 
how both parties have a common goal in honouring the duty to consult, each side reiterates the 
justness of their interpretations of proper consultation. As a result, crisis situations raise the stakes 
for both parties, making the exchanges between Indigenous peoples and the government difficult 
to identify points of compromise. Relationships that are characterized by the emergence of crises 
also changes the development of interactions between actors. Over time, crises may widen and 
entrench differences between actors, differences that are further reinforced through the feedback 
loop. Dialogical relationships become meaningless if there are no points in which different 
perspectives can reach common understandings.  
Relying on crisis situations to initiate dialogue regarding conflicting Indigenous and Crown 
interests impairs the building of trust that is essential to institutional systems’ goal of reconciling 
Indigenous rights with Crown sovereignty. Trust is heavily dependent on the distribution of power 
in society; Indigenous peoples distrust the institutional system because it is perceived as an 
instrument of oppression.236 Indigenous peoples attempt to correct power asymmetries through 
collective acts of contention. This display of power also threatens the institutional system, causing 
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the state to suspend its current actions to address the confrontation made by external pressures. 
The outcome of the exchange is determined by the degree to which Indigenous peoples frame their 
mobilization to appear legitimate and the institutions ability to make adjustments to remain 
legitimate. But regardless of how power is redistributed, the trust between parties is damaged. 
Even when each party’s actions may be perceived as legitimate, both parties may distrust the other 
party’s goodwill to act within the newly established protocols. Trust is repaired over time, as each 
side experiences and observes each other’s compliance to the new practices or guidelines. 
However, there is also the possibility that the distrust created from the initial act of contention 
creates an incentive for a party to reassert their power in another area of interaction to compensate 
for their previous loss of power. Once again, the resulting confrontation may change power 
distributions, but it may weaken the overall trust between the parties.  
Trust is a significant part of Indigenous-Crown relations because it makes possible the idea 
that overarching Crown sovereignty can respect Indigenous ways of being. However, the narrative 
of Indigenous collective contention alongside the institutional system’s attempt to remain 
legitimate resembles exchanges made between distrustful parties. The crisis situation caused by 
confrontations between collective action and institutional change presents opportunities to alter 
the parameters and interpretations of Indigenous-Crown constitutional obligations. Idle No More 
and the Rexton Shale Gas protests illustrate that Indigenous peoples radically opposed the 
government’s practice of consultation, and wished to replace that interpretation with an Indigenous 
vision of appropriate consultation. If Indigenous peoples contest aspects of their constitutional 
relationship with the Crown because they can only trust their own laws and traditions to protect 
their interests, then the vision that Crown sovereignty can be trusted to respect Indigenous rights 
is undermined. The assertion of Crown sovereignty is a firmly established fact within the 
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institutional system. Indigenous peoples’ challenges against this fact through high stakes 
confrontation may seriously imperil the institutional system’s capacity to justly interpret the 
constitution.  
The distrust experienced between Indigenous peoples and the Crown is communicated 
within the dialogical interaction between collective action and institutional change. Hostility 
affects actors’ practices and behaviours, which influences the recreation of Indigenous-settle 
relations. As actors engage different perspectives with distrust, the resulting Indigenous-settler 
context closes opportunities for actors to approach different constitutional demands through 
alternative practices, such as negotiation and compromise. The feedback loop has the potential to 
encourage parties to constructively contest constitutional obligations, but the path dependent 
nature of dialogical interactions can also create conditions in which changing Indigenous-settler 
relations becomes more difficult. In effect, the reliance on crises restrains actors from adopting 
new practices to contest constitutional obligations. This effect only intensifies the dependence on 
crises situations to resolve constitutional disputes, while also decreasing alternative practices to 
address contestation. As such, the character of Indigenous-settler relations will not be significantly 
transformed, while the feasibility of implementing alternative practices to pursing change will 
decrease.  
The institutional systems’ overreliance on piecemeal adjustments to constitutional 
interpretations rather than comprehensive amendments exacerbates the institutional pressure to 
interpret the constitution fairly. Ironically, a constitutional crisis may occur as a result of 
eschewing questions of fundamental constitutional reform. Crisis situations present some new 
opportunities for critical institutional change. However, without the proper institutional 
mechanisms to manage the possible alternative reforms, a crisis situation may simply destroy the 
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possibility for meaningful reform. The experiences of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords 
demonstrate that improper institutional mechanisms, such as executive federalism and referenda, 
may undermine the entire reform project. Similarly, providing no institutional mechanism besides 
piecemeal approaches guided by the eruption of crises may also put at risk proposals for necessary 
constitutional reform.  
 
Possible Reforms 
The duty to consult is a constitutional obligation that is meant to reconcile possible 
conflicting rights interests. As such, the duty to consult is a mechanism that can mitigate conflicts 
before crisis situations occur by addressing Indigenous-Crown interests in light of past injustices 
and future initiatives to strengthen communities. The duty to consult serves as an interesting 
perspective to evaluate Indigenous-Crown conflict over constitutional obligations, and it may be 
the best constitutional mechanism to resolve future conflicts. A robust implementation of the duty 
to consult can address the dilemma between the need for institutional protocols to guide contention 
and accepting groups’ contestation towards the status quo constitutional order.  
The duty to consult already entails some institutional protocols, such as the spectrum 
criteria that delineates the boundaries of proper consultation. However, more institutional practices 
can enhance the ways in which governments upholds the duty to consult. For instance, the current 
consultative framework is not clear regarding when the duty to consult is triggered. The 
government must consult Indigenous peoples when they have knowledge of Indigenous rights or 
rights claims.237 This practice does not clearly state the degree to which the government must 
secure proper knowledge of Indigenous rights claims. Putting in place an institutional body that 
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assesses conflicting rights claims can ensure that both parties have equal access to contesting the 
terms of appropriate consultation within the parameters set by the specific situation. This 
additional consultative process may be better equipped to fairly organize conflicting rights claims 
than the current process of expecting all government departments to spend resources on 
researching Indigenous peoples’ rights claims.238  
The composition of the institution should include both Indigenous and Crown 
representatives who have knowledge regarding the assessment of diverse values and worldviews. 
For example, Indigenous and non-Indigenous mediators can identify the disputed core practices 
that underpin rights claims in order to detect instances in which negotiation is possible. In effect, 
these mediators would provide dispute resolution when conflicting interests emerge, which is a 
practice some Indigenous peoples expressed as highly relevant to making consultative processes 
meaningful.239 The non-Indigenous representatives should be appointed by the government, while 
the Indigenous positions should be representatives chosen by the five national aboriginal 
organizations: the Assembly of First Nations, the Congress of Aboriginal People, the Métis 
National Council, the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, and the Native Women’s Association of Canada. 
The risk that the government may appoint individuals with similar policy preferences, or that the 
national aboriginal organizations lack legitimacy because they do not reflect the attitudes of 
Indigenous peoples at the community level may never be fully omitted. Nevertheless, the politics 
surrounding appointments can be partly remedied by implementing strict qualifications for the 
positions. The role of the institution itself and the expertise required for the position can 
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significantly curtail the preferences of the individuals. Furthermore, the duration of the positions 
should not have a quick turnover rate. Longer-term appointments would strengthen decision-
making in future disputes because members can recall experiences from previous disputes and the 
members are familiar with one another’s mediation style.   
Consequently, creating a separate institutional body allows Indigenous peoples to put 
forward their rights claims with evidence and rationales that support Indigenous perspectives of 
the strength of the claim. Providing a formal institution that acknowledges rights claims made on 
their own terms respects Indigenous peoples’ perspective regarding the strength of the claim. Such 
a reform addresses the concern that rights claims assessments made outside of Indigenous 
worldviews obscure understanding of how Indigenous ways of life are threatened.240 This 
development would significantly transform the government’s consultative duties as an active 
exercise to constantly engage with Indigenous interests. Respecting Indigenous judgements 
regarding the validity of their claim signifies the Crown is taking seriously their task to deal with 
Indigenous peoples honourably.241  
An institutional arrangement that delegates the assessment of rights claims in one 
specialized body also ensures that knowledge of conflicting claims and interests are assessed to 
find possible solutions in anticipation of Crown proposals. Before the government articulates its 
policy mandate, it can consult this institution to determine the reaction of Indigenous peoples. 
Implementing a practice in which the government uses expertise regarding Indigenous rights 
claims before proposing their policy preferences can avoid severe backlash towards their mandate. 
The reactions to the federal government’s Bill C-45 and the New Brunswick government’s 
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decision to allow SWN Resources to conduct seismic testing could have been mitigated if 
government took seriously Indigenous interests. A formal institutional body can make Indigenous 
interests easily accessible for government officials, making it difficult for the government to ignore 
Indigenous perspectives. As such, this organization would only have consultative powers that are 
equally accessible between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. The new institutional 
mechanism should not replace decision-making that emerges as a result of interactions between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors from different macro level groups.  The capacity to 
compromise and negotiate are integral to relationship building between actors with diverse 
interests. Consequently, a new institutional mechanism should facilitate meaningful consultation 
rather than become the site to fulfill the duty to consult. Moreover, if the government chose to 
overlook the information made available in this new institutional body, the judiciary could more 
easily assess whether the government failed to uphold consultative duties; the judiciary would 
discern whether the knowledge made available through the interactions made between the 
institution and the specific Indigenous nation were adequate to constitute knowledge of a potential 
Aboriginal right or title.242 
A separate institutional body can also help the judiciary to fairly evaluate both Indigenous 
and Crown obligations to proceed with good faith during consultation. If Indigenous claims and 
interests are treated fairly by this institutional body, then Indigenous peoples’ participation and 
cooperation with this body can indicate whether Indigenous peoples are cooperating with good 
faith. The perception that this institution is fair towards Indigenous interests comes from the 
composition of the institution as well as its practices. The inclusion of Indigenous peoples with 
expertise regarding the evaluation of diverse interests is necessary to build trust between the 
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institution and Indigenous peoples. The Indigenous individuals within the specialized body must 
be able to understand Indigenous worldviews and values and translate those perceptions so that 
non-Indigenous peoples can recognize and evaluate those claims. In order to uphold this standard, 
some Indigenous members of the institution should be appointed based on their mediation 
qualifications and some members should be chosen by the Indigenous community that is involved 
in the specific dispute. The members that represent a specific Indigenous nation will hold 
temporary offices that expire after an agreement on the terms of consultation are established. An 
Indigenous nation can appoint the same or different temporary members if mediation is required 
in later stages of decision making within the same dispute between the Crown and an Indigenous 
nation. This arrangement would balance the necessity to have members that are experienced in 
mediating different systems of values and individuals who understand the worldviews of a 
particular Indigenous nation. However, the institution must be flexible enough to adjust according 
to external contestation. Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples should retain their capacity to 
contest the ways in which the institution evaluates diversity claims. Indeed, fair consultation must 
involve the parties’ capacity to contest the terms of consultation, including the treatment of claims. 
In this specific context, the judiciary can effectively intervene to use legal principles to distinguish 
between reasonable attempts to address all competing interests.  
The character of Indigenous-settler constitutional relationships evolves over time through 
interactions between macro and micro level actors. When a new understanding of Indigenous-
settler relationships emerges, further transformations through macro and micro level interaction 
between actors occur. The exchanges between institutions’ understandings of constitutional 
obligations and the subsequent mobilization against those institutions’ decisions reveal the current 
character of Indigenous-settler relationships. Currently, this evolving relationship is characterized 
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by creating new opportunities for macro and micro level changes by encouraging actors to pursue 
that change in an antagonistic fashion. Antagonism between actors is exposed through crisis 
situations. Relying on crises to provoke interactions between actors increases the likelihood that 
opportunities for transforming Indigenous-settler relationships will be completely undermined. 
This risk can be mitigated by implementing robust mechanisms of consultation. A new 
institutionalized process of consultation can permit actors to contest existing relationships in a 

















Indigenous-settler disputes consist of the interplay between different actors’ interactions as 
they reinterpret the nature and scope of constitutional obligations between Indigenous peoples and 
the Crown. For instance, the Crown’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples is a disputed 
constitutional obligation. Its purpose is to maintain meaningful Indigenous-Crown relationships 
and guide the development of future Indigenous-Crown interactions. Indigenous-settler 
relationships are contested due to the Canadian Constitution’s ambiguous recognition of 
Indigenous rights in historic treaties, The Royal Proclamation, 1763 and s. 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982. Canada’s constitutional order relies on an arrangement in which citizens re-evaluate 
their constitutional status through processes of policy change informed by ongoing SCC decisions. 
Since the failed experiences of formal constitutional amendment, constitutional changes are 
traditionally developed incrementally over time in Canada.  
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The institutional system responsible for justly interpreting the constitution must respond to 
external sources of contestation. However, the separate institutions within the system, such as the 
government and the judiciary, may experience their own disputes when determining the 
appropriate nature and scope of Indigenous-Crown constitutional obligations. In the context of 
Indigenous-settler relationships, the historical institutional model that emphasizes forces of 
incremental change reflects institutions’ past adjustments to external pressures. This model also 
helps explain future developments within institutional systems because of how path dependency 
shapes decision-making. Each institution follows its own path dependent decision-making that is 
affected by other institutions in the system as well as non-institutionalized actors. Disputes emerge 
when individual institutions make decisions that prevent the institutional system from operating 
consistently to secure positive outcomes.  
For instance, the judiciary and the government assert different understandings of 
appropriate consultation with Indigenous peoples. Each institution attempts to enforce their own 
interpretation, resulting in tensions and instability within the institutional system. The legal norms 
established by the judiciary that guide appropriate consultation inadequately compel the 
government to pursue robust forms of consultation with Indigenous peoples. The case law 
pertaining to the duty to consult so far has closed certain possibilities for Indigenous peoples to 
pursue their vision of reconciliation. In the Rio Tinto case, the SCC stated that only the specific 
Crown action in the case can trigger the duty to consult.243 This ruling prevents the duty to consult 
from addressing and correcting past unjust decision-making. Additionally, the Little Salmon case 
revealed the judiciary’s hesitation to outright denounce the Yukon government’s insufficient 
understanding of Indigenous rights and demands as a barrier to fulfilling Indigenous perspectives 
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of fair dealing. This decision reveals that governments can fulfill the legal requirements of 
adequate consultation without considering the perspectives of Indigenous peoples. Consequently, 
the government excludes Indigenous participation in articulating the terms for just consultation to 
pursue its policy preferences.  
When the institutional system fails to accommodate the demands of external pressures, 
Indigenous peoples can collectively provoke different change within the institutional system, 
which would consequently transform Indigenous-settler relationships. According to the political 
process model, these contentious acts are made in reaction to the decisions of other actors, such as 
institutions, and thus have path dependent qualities. Once a contentious action is made to exploit 
a political opportunity following an institutional decision, the event unfolds and presents new 
opportunities and constraints for future interactions between actors. The Idle No More movement 
and the Rexton Shale Gas protests illustrate how contentious actions exploit political opportunities 
in situations where institutional decisions appear to overlook individuals’ interests. The ways in 
which Indigenous protesters framed their positions in these protest movements also demonstrate 
how their interests are determined by previous developments within Indigenous-settler 
constitutional relationships. For instance, both of these movements demanded the government to 
honour the duty to consult in a manner that considered Indigenous perspectives of fair dealing. 
This demand contests the legal requirements regarding the duty to consult, in which the 
government is not obliged to seek Indigenous participation when setting the terms of appropriate 
consultation.  
The interplay between actors fulfilling different roles produces a new outcome within the 
system of Indigenous-settler relationships. Actors within macro roles, such as in institutional 
systems and within social movements, attempt to change the system of relationships by altering 
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the behaviours of actors at the individual level. When micro level actors’ have different attitudes, 
they will behave differently within their macro level roles; the different behaviours create 
systematic change. In order for the system of Indigenous-settler relationships to evolve in a manner 
that promotes constructive interactions between actors, all actors must make decisions that 
facilitate the participation of other actors to meaningfully participate. Decisions that make 
negotiation impossible between different parties, or relying on a context of decision-making that 
reduces the likelihood of mutual understanding inhibits the development of Indigenous-settler 
relationships. When considering the duty to consult, the government is impeding on improving 
Indigenous-settler relationships by not implementing necessary measures to ensure that all parties 
equally participate in meaningful exchanges. The feedback loop integrates distrust between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors into the status quo context of Indigenous-settler 
relationships, which further entrenches the unlikelihood of reconciliation between competing 
interests.  
 A new institutional body that can facilitate meaningful consultation between Indigenous 
peoples and the Crown may address the current shortcomings in current consultative practices. 
This new institution can serve to mediate conflicting Indigenous-Crown interests and clarify the 
expectations of each actor to participate honourably. Mediators can sort through different demands 
in a manner that equally respects the perspectives of each actor. Under this arrangement, 
Indigenous attitudes regarding adequate consultation will be evaluated equally alongside existing 
procedures. Moreover, assigning one specialized institution the task of finding points of 
commonality between different interests can also help delineate the degree to which each party is 
participating with good faith. By making the interests of each party accessible to other actors, there 
is less justification for decision-making that excludes certain perspectives.  
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The interplay of interactions between different actors guides the development of 
Indigenous-settler relationships. Contestation regarding the character of Indigenous-settler 
relationships can be constructive if actors use existing differences as an opportunity to renegotiate 
unjust practices. Improving actors’ capacity to meaningfully interact with one another also 
improves the capacity of the entire system to adjust according to the needs of each actor. The duty 
to consult is a dimension of Indigenous-Crown relations, but it is also a principle that can improve 
the political relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Indeed, the opportunity 
to improve consultation procedures may reveal new alternatives to reimagine a just Indigenous-
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